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THE DIGNITARY CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Erin Sheley*
Abstract: For seventeen years, the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
has been confused and confusing. In Crawford v. Washington (2004), the Court overruled prior
precedent and held that “testimonial” out-of-court statements could not be admitted at trial
unless the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, even when the
statement would be otherwise admissible as particularly reliable under an exception to the rule
against hearsay. In a series of contradictory opinions over the next several years, the Court
proceeded to expand and then seemingly roll back this holding, leading to widespread chaos
in common types of cases, particularly those involving statements to law enforcement officers
and written affidavits of crime lab technicians. In these cases, for apparently pragmatic reasons,
various pluralities of the Court appear to have redefined “testimonial” to mean, at least in part,
“potentially unreliable,” thereby contradicting the goal of Crawford.
To help courts resolve this confusion, this Article proposes an overlooked, residual
constitutional value, distinct from reliability, implicated in cases where defendants cannot
confront witnesses who testify against them. Integrating historical and narrative analysis of the
confrontation right’s origins in Anglo-American law with the psychological literature on guilt
and deceit, it argues that a criminal defendant has a relational interest in asserting their moral
presence against a potentially deceitful witness. It further argues that this interest harmonizes
with the contemporary function of dignity in criminal constitutional jurisprudence. The Article
concludes that criminal defendants have a distinct dignitary interest in confronting witnesses
against them. It urges courts to untangle the contradictory web of Crawford and its progeny by
considering the dignitary dimensions of the Confrontation Clause.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Stuart v. Alabama,1 a
Sixth Amendment challenge to the State’s introduction of a written blood
alcohol report through the in-court testimony of a lab technician who did
not prepare it.2 In a dissent from denial of certiorari that received an
unusual amount of media attention,3 Justice Gorsuch argued that the
Alabama procedures violated the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence of the past decade, because they allowed Stuart to be
convicted of driving under the influence based on the testimony of a lab
technician other than the one who had personally conducted the blood
alcohol test.4 This outcome, Gorsuch said, broke the Sixth Amendment’s
“promise” that criminal defendants have the right to confront their
accusers.5
The context of Stuart is a doctrinal mess familiar to all scholars and
practitioners of criminal procedure, one which Gorsuch accurately
described as a “problem . . . largely of [the Supreme Court’s] creation.”6
With the 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington,7 authored by Justice
Scalia, the Court untethered Confrontation Clause analysis from the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 36 (2018).
Id. at 36.
Jules Epstein, Continuing Crawford/Confrontation “Confusion”, 34 CRIM. JUST. 67 (2019).
Stuart, 139 S. Ct. at 36 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Id.
Id.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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reliability tests created by the hearsay rules.8 In Crawford the Court held
that “testimonial” statements made outside the courtroom shall not be
introduced if the defendant does not have an opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant, even if the statement falls under a recognized exception to
the rule against hearsay.9 Subsequent cases, Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts10 and Bullcoming v. New Mexico,11 clarified that this rule
applies even to the written testimony of crime lab technicians, whose
signed affidavits confirming the results of their various tests had
previously been routinely admitted by criminal courts under various
hearsay exceptions.12
Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming created a bright-line test,
ostensibly grounded in an original understanding of the Sixth Amendment
as preventing the state from using ex parte witness examinations against
the accused.13 Yet subsequent cases, still purporting to turn on whether a
statement is “testimonial,” have introduced mass confusion. In Williams
v. Illinois,14 multiple fractured pluralities searching for a coherent theory
attempted to limit the application of Crawford in lab tech cases, for what
seem to have been largely pragmatic reasons related to the efficiency of
the criminal justice system.15 And in Michigan v. Bryant,16 authored by
Justice Sotomayor over a strenuous dissent by Justice Scalia, the Court
reversed course on clear language in Crawford, holding that the reliability
tests embodied in well-recognized hearsay exceptions are, in fact,
relevant to whether an out-of-court statement triggers the Confrontation
Clause.17
The line of cases between Crawford and Bryant has generated a great
deal of scholarly commentary and case law, centered in large part on the
question of what scope courts should give Crawford to best protect the
accuracy of trial results.18 Some have contended that this amount of

8. Id. at 68–69.
9. Id. at 59–61.
10. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
11. 564 U.S. 647 (2011).
12. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311; Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 652.
13. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 329; Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 665.
14. 567 U.S. 50 (2012).
15. Id. at 84–85.
16. 562 U.S. 344 (2011).
17. Id. at 358–59. For a discussion of the varying role of reliability in hearsay exceptions, see FED.
R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s note to 2019 amendment.
18. See Mark Spottswood, Truth, Lies, and the Confrontation Clause, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 565,
566–67 (2018).
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scholarly ink is not entirely justified by the problem’s scope.19 The
confrontation right is purely a trial right, and in a criminal justice system
where 90% to 95% of cases are resolved in plea bargains20—a key
structural feature that drives the choices of indigent defendants, guilty and
innocent alike—it may seem unwarranted for courts and criminal
proceduralists to debate this particular doctrinal question so heavily.21
The Crawford debate is particularly important because the vast
majority of criminal cases never go to trial and therefore the constitutional
procedures governing the few trials that do occur impact defendants’
incentives at plea bargaining. Plea bargains happen in part because
defendants, even innocent defendants, face uncertain odds against the
monolithic investigative and prosecutorial apparatus of the state.22 In light
of this reality, the relative scarcity of actual criminal trials only amplifies
the importance of the rights that constrain them.
The paradox of Crawford and its progeny is that the Court announced
a break from an accuracy-based Sixth Amendment analysis to one turning
on whether an out-of-court statement is “testimonial”23—despite the fact
that the word “testimonial” appears nowhere in the text of the
Sixth Amendment.24 The Court then, for apparently practical reasons and
while continuing to describe the confrontation right as limited to
“testimonial” statements, essentially redefined “testimonial” to mean, at
least in part, potentially inaccurate.25
This Article is the first to propose a distinct constitutional value, apart
from accuracy, that may be implicated in cases where defendants do not
get to confront witnesses who give testimony against them. It asks, in
short, whether there is a residual Sixth Amendment value that is not
already captured by the accuracy-based limitations on hearsay evidence.
Through historical and narrative analysis of the confrontation right’s
origins in Anglo-American law, it concludes that criminal defendants
have a distinct dignitary interest in confronting witnesses against them.
Courts seeking to untangle the web created by Crawford, Williams, and
Bryant should look to the dignitary dimensions of the Confrontation

19. Id. at 567.
20. See LINDSEY DEVERS, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, DEP’T OF JUST., PLEA AND CHARGE
BARGAINING RESEARCH SUMMARY 1 (2011), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media
/document/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QHQ-AWCA].
21. See Spottswood, supra note 18, at 566–67.
22. See generally William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004).
23. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–53.
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Clause as they set its limits.
As a methodological matter, this analysis starts with the premise that,
in precedent-based common law systems, the historical justifications for
a legal rule become part of the rule itself. Digging deeply into not only the
history but also the rhetoric that produced the rule allows courts and
practitioners to better understand it. This Article therefore draws upon
what has been described as the “law-as-narrative trope,” in which “law is
merely a story, one subjective rendering among many.”26 Specifically, it
considers the legal discourse originating in the influential treason trial of
Sir Walter Raleigh to trace the original legal narrative giving rise to the
idea that criminal defendants ought to have a right to confront witnesses
against them.27 Raleigh’s trial has been widely regarded as one of the
earliest inflection points in the development of both the confrontation
right and hearsay law.28 And yet the actual narratives Raleigh used to
attack the Crown’s use of an out-of-court statement against him reveal a
dignitary core to confrontation that the Supreme Court has ignored in the
recent Confrontation Clause cases.
This Article has four parts. Part I gives a history of the confrontation
right up to and including the 2004 Crawford case, its progeny, and its
many critics, illuminating the confusion around what sorts of out-of-court
statements currently trigger Sixth Amendment protections. Part II argues
for a dignitary view of the confrontation right. It first identifies the specific
dignitary aspects of confrontation embodied in Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial
speeches in his defense. It then collects the psychological literature on
guilt and deceit, demonstrating how confronting a defendant may produce
emotional guilt on the part of a lying witness. It argues that the defendant’s
relational interest in producing such feelings in a witness advances not
26. Guyora Binder, The Law-as-Literature Trope, in 2 LAW AND LITERATURE: CURRENT LEGAL
ISSUES 63, 72–73 (Michael Freeman & Andrew D.E. Lewis eds., 1999). Narrative has been used as
an explanatory mechanism across a wide variety of legal fields. For a representative sample see id. at
72 n.7. As Peter Brooks argues:
The study of the modalities of narrative presentation—use of points of view, verb tenses,
flashbacks, and the like—induces a sense of the uneasy relations of telling and told, an awareness
of how narrative discourse is never innocent, but always presentational, a way of working on
story events that is also a way of working on the listener or reader.
Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC
IN THE LAW 14, 17 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). The narratives courts use to present
justifications for constitutional rules are no exception. Bernard S. Jackson has argued that legal rules
derived from case law are “socially constructed narratives, accompanied by particular (and
increasingly institutionalized) forms of approval or disapproval” where “‘law’ and ‘fact’ are reduced
to the same level—of narrative structures—and the process of ‘application’ becomes one of
comparison.” BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT, AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 101–06 (1988).
27. See Harry L. Stephen, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh: A Lecture Given in Connection with the
Raleigh Tercentenary Commemoration, in 2 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 172, 176 (1919).
28. See id.
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only accuracy but also dignitary values. Finally, it explores the additional
dignitary interests a defendant may have in functioning as a human,
embodied listener to the narrative that helps convict him, rather than being
excluded from the declarant’s out-of-court testimony to a representative
of the state machinery that prosecutes the defendant. Part III introduces
the philosophical and legal foundation for dignitary rights generally and
discusses the specific dignitary rights of criminal defendants. It concludes
that the dignitary values Part II identified as implicit in confrontation
harmonize with other concepts of dignity already widely recognized by
the Supreme Court. Part IV offers suggestions for how courts can use this
dignitary conception of the Confrontation Clause more clearly to
determine the limits of Crawford.
I.

CRAWFORD AND ITS DISCONTENTS

This Part summarizes the history of the confrontation right prior to and
at the Founding and explains why courts had generally assumed that the
evidentiary laws governing hearsay protected that right. It then presents
the sea change represented by Crawford, the contradictory subsequent
case law, and its practical results.
A.

History of the Confrontation Right

As Justice Harlan noted in 1970, “[h]istory seems to give us very little
insight into the intended scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause.”29 The hearsay affidavit famously admitted against Sir Walter
Raleigh in 1603 came in under the “Marian statutes” (enacted during the
reign of Queen Mary I),30 which provided that witnesses in felony cases
be questioned under oath by justices of the peace and allowed such outof-court statements to be admitted at trial if a witness subsequently
became unavailable.31 Despite the outcry occasioned by Raleigh’s trial,
hearsay testimony was regularly admitted in English courts until at least
1675.32 Wigmore said that the “fixing” of the doctrine of the law against
hearsay appears to have taken place at some point between 1675 and
1690.33 Yet some eighteenth-century authorities seem to retain conflicting
29. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
30. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
31. John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder
Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 82 (1983).
32. John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 444–45 (1904).
33. See id. at 445; see also King v. Paine (1696) 87 Eng. Rep. 584, 584; 5 Mod. 163, 163 (KB)
(holding dead defendant’s examination inadmissible because “the defendant, not being present before
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views of the admissibility of hearsay evidence.34
Relevant to the development of the confrontation right is the fact that
prior to the 1730s, lawyers played little or no role in English criminal
trials.35 During this period, defendants and defense witnesses were
forbidden from testifying under oath in their own defense, due to the
concern that they would have too great a temptation to violate their oaths
by lying (thereby putting their immortal souls in danger).36 In felony
cases, the prosecution might have had counsel, but the defense did not.37
As a result, these trials lacked most of the features we associate with the
adversarial system today: there were no opening or closing statements,
direct or cross-examinations of witnesses, or evidentiary or procedural
motions.38 The records from this era reveal that judges often played an
important role in questioning witnesses and also that the accused,
unassisted by counsel, conducted examinations of witnesses on their own
behalf.39 While the accused spoke unsworn, the records reveal that they
would frequently reply to evidence that lay within their personal
knowledge.40
Although sources disagree on the precise timing and consistency of the
hearsay rule’s adoption, what is clear is that the potential importance of a
defendant confronting testifying witnesses became a matter of public
outcry during the events of the so-called “Popish Plot” of 1678, in which
disgruntled cleric Titus Oates falsely claimed knowledge of a Catholic
conspiracy to assassinate King Charles II.41 At the trials of the so-called
Catholic conspirators, many defense witnesses testified that Oates could
not have known of any assassination attempt, as he had been in France,
not London, at the time the alleged events took place.42 Yet the defense

the magistrate when they were taken, had no opportunity to cross-examine them.” (emphasis
omitted)).
34. See, e.g., Fenwick’s Case (1696) 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 591–92 (H.C.); see also Spottswood,
supra note 18, at 573–74 (discussing Sir Geoffrey Gilbert’s 1754 treatise on evidence law, which at
one point states that “mere Hearsay is no Evidence,” while at others describes many circumstances in
which hearsay is admissible, such as when it corroborates the testimony of a live witness, was given
during a pre-trial examination, or was preserved as part of a recorded deposition in a prior dispute
between the two parties).
35. John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 272 (1978).
36. See GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 122–28 (1756).
37. Langbein, supra note 35, at 282.
38. Id. at 282–83.
39. Id. at 283.
40. Id.
41. See generally Popish Plot, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/
event/Popish-Plot [https://perma.cc/CFB4-AQEW].
42. Spottswood, supra note 18, at 574.
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witnesses were prevented from testifying under oath. Nonetheless, the
court instructed the jury that it had to give greater weight to Oates’ sworn
statements before the Privy Council, which were not cross-examined by
the defendants, than to the unsworn testimony of the defense witnesses at
trial.43 After twenty-two men were executed, and a mass anti-Catholic
hysteria erupted, Oates’ lies came to light and he himself was tried and
pilloried for perjury.44
Of more direct relevance to the drafters of the Sixth Amendment, the
Crown’s enforcement of the Stamp Act of 176545 against the American
colonies created a new flood of suspicion against processes that did not
allow for confrontation.46 To avoid jury nullification in cases brought
under the highly unpopular act, the Crown tried them in admiralty court,
which had civil-style procedures that regularly admitted ex parte
depositions and denied the defendant’s right to be present during crossexamination.47
The Founders’ opposition to such a state of affairs is manifest in John
Adams’ arguments in defense of a merchant in admiralty court, which was
quoted by the Supreme Court in Crawford: “[e]xaminations of witnesses
upon Interrogatories, are only by the Civil Law. Interrogatories are
unknown at common Law, and Englishmen and common Lawyers have
an aversion to them if not an Abhorrence of them.”48 Likewise, George
Mason, generally considered to be the principal author of the Bill of
Rights, objected to the Stamp Act tribunals in a letter to the London
Society of Merchants, written under the pseudonym “A Virginia
Planter.”49 He decried how the Stamp Act trial processes:
[M]ake an odious distinction between us and our fellow-subjects
43. Id.
44. See ENCYC. BRITANNICA, supra note 41.
45. Duties in America (Stamp) Act 1765, 5 Geo. 3 c. 12 (Eng.).
46. ENCYC. BRITANNICA, supra note 41. The objectionable processes created by the Stamp Act
also became the basis for the right to a jury trial in both criminal cases (under the Sixth Amendment)
and in civil cases (under the Seventh Amendment). See Thomas E. Carney & Susan Kolb, The Legacy
of Forsey v. Cunningham: Safeguarding the Integrity of the Right to Trial by Jury, 69 HISTORIAN
663, 687 (2007). While the Seventh Amendment does not contain a parallel confrontation right in
civil cases, the Supreme Court has held that, as a matter of due process, “[i]n almost every setting
where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). But see Tucker
v. Va. State Bar, 357 S.E.2d 525, 532 (Va. 1987) (holding that the right to confront and cross-examine
does not apply in civil cases).
47. See Spottswood, supra note 18, at 576.
48. Draft of Argument in Sewall v. Hancock (1768–1769), in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS
194, 207 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
49. 1 KATE MASON ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON, 1725–1792, at 129 (Russell &
Russell 1964) (1892).
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residing in Great Britain, by depriving us of the ancient trial, by a
jury of our equals, and substituting in its place an arbitrary civillaw court—to put it in the power of every sycophant and
informer . . . to drag a freeman a thousand miles from his own
country (whereby he may be deprived of the benefit of evidence)
to defend his property before a judge . . . .50
Despite this obvious concern over civil-style interrogatories, there is no
record of debate over the Confrontation Clause from the First Congress.51
The upshot of this history is that the Sixth Amendment, insofar as it
relates (as Mason indicates) to “evidence,” unavoidably implicates some
of the same concerns about accuracy that appear to have motivated
common law courts to adopt hearsay rules throughout the late seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. If the tragedy of the “Popish Plot” brought
public attention to the reliability problems created by hearsay evidence
admitted without cross-examination, by the time of the debate over the
Stamp Act tribunals, revolutionary rhetoric had come to link reliability
questions to broader concerns over national identity. Mason describes
interrogatories as creating an “odious distinction” between Englishmen
and English colonists, while Adams makes a distinction between
Englishmen generally and the continental Europeans whose justice
systems allow such processes.52
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court did not consider a major Confrontation
Clause case until 1895. In Mattox v. United States,53 the Court declared
that “[t]he primary object of [the clause] . . . was to prevent depositions or
ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being
used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and crossexamination of the witness.”54 It is this definition that would form the
basis for the modern revolution in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
B.

Modern Cases

In the most recent pre-Crawford case to state a Confrontation Clause
test, Ohio v. Roberts,55 the Supreme Court held that a prior statement of a
witness who did not testify at trial could be introduced if (1) the witness
was “unavailable” to testify and (2) the prior statement bore adequate

50. Id. at 383.
51. John G. Douglass, Confrontation Clause, HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/consti
tution/#!/amendments/6/essays/156/confrontation-clause [https://perma.cc/4D24-SGMZ].
52. ROWLAND, supra note 49, at 383.
53. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
54. Id. at 242.
55. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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“indicia of reliability” to substitute for the lack of cross-examination.56
The Court held that “reliability” could be inferred if the prior statement
fell within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception or was otherwise
supported by “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”57
In 2004, however, Crawford v. Washington severed the hearsay
analysis from the Confrontation Clause analysis.58 In Crawford, the State
of Washington had tried to introduce the tape-recorded statements of a
wife who gave police an account of her husband stabbing a man who had
tried to rape her.59 The statements diverged from the defendant’s own
account and, as the wife ultimately asserted marital privilege and did not
testify, the court admitted the tape-recorded statements on the grounds
that they bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” under
Roberts (specifically because they interlocked in several respects with the
defendant’s statements).60
Finding that the Founders intended the Confrontation Clause to
prohibit the use of ex parte examinations as in the civil law system, the
Court explained that the Clause sometimes overlapped with hearsay rules,
yet remained distinct:
[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core
concerns. An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable
evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay
rules, but it bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the
Confrontation Clause targeted. On the other hand, ex parte
examinations might sometimes be admissible under modern
hearsay rules, but the Framers certainly would not have condoned
them.61
The Court went on to say that the Confrontation Clause is concerned
specifically with “testimonial” hearsay.62 This includes not only ex parte

56. Id. at 66.
57. Id. This synthesis of common law hearsay and the Confrontation Clause mirrors the Supreme
Court of Canada’s interpretation of the confrontation right under section 7 of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, which turns on whether the proponent of an out-of-court statement can meet twin
prongs of “necessity” and “reliability.” R. v Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, paras. 48–60 (Can.)
(holding that “the constitutional right guaranteed under s. 7 of the Charter is not the right to confront
or cross-examine adverse witnesses in itself” and that “if the trial judge determines that the evidence
falls within one of the traditional common law [hearsay] exceptions, this finding is conclusive and
the evidence is ruled admissible, unless, in a rare case, the exception itself is challenged as described
in both those decisions”).
58. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
59. Id. at 38–39.
60. Id. at 41.
61. Id. at 51 (emphasis omitted).
62. Id. at 53.
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testimony at formal proceedings such as preliminary hearings, but also
statements taken during interrogations by police, which “bear a striking
resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in England.”63 It
concluded that, “where testimonial statements are involved, we do not
think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the
vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of
‘reliability.’”64 While “leav[ing] for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial,’” the Court held that where
testimonial statements are at issue, the accused must have a right to
confront the declarant and cross-examine them.65
The Crawford decision created substantial consternation among
prosecutors. It quickly became clear that this ruling would make a
particular difference to existing practice in two common scenarios. The
first was domestic abuse prosecutions in which the reporting female
victim had changed her mind about testifying against her abuser and her
original reports had come in as excited utterances or under other, similar
exceptions to the hearsay rule.66 The second was cases involving forensic
testing in which, hitherto, courts had routinely admitted lab reports under
business records exceptions, without requiring the specific technician
responsible for the testing to take the stand.67 These are not, of course, the
only scenarios in which the Crawford rule would make a difference, but
they did each produce their own line of Supreme Court cases.
1.

Domestic Violence Cases

A pair of cases, Davis v. Washington68 and Hammon v. Indiana,69
presented slightly different factual configurations of a common problem.
In Davis, Michelle McCottry called 911 to report that her ex-boyfriend
was “here jumpin’ on me again.”70 She specified that he was “usin’ his

63. Id. at 52; see also id. at 53 (“Justices of the peace conducting examinations under the Marian
statutes were not magistrates as we understand that office today, but had an essentially investigative
and prosecutorial function.”).
64. Id. at 61.
65. Id. at 68. It is worth noting that the Crawford Court did identify one historical exception to the
rule that testimonial statements must be subject to cross-examination: the dying declaration. In a
footnote the Court noted that “[a]lthough many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is
authority for admitting even those that clearly are,” but deferred consideration of this question. Id. at
56 n.6.
66. See discussion infra section I.B.1.
67. See discussion infra section I.B.2.
68. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
69. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
70. Id. at 817.
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fists” and identified him by name to the 911 operator.71 McCottry did not
appear at trial and the trial court admitted the 911 call as an excited
utterance for hearsay purposes.72 The Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed this decision, concluding that McCottry’s identification of Davis
to the 911 operator was not testimonial.73 In Hammon, police responded
to a report of domestic disturbance at the home of Hershel and Amy
Hammon, the latter of whom gave permission for the officers to enter the
home.74 After some conversation with the officers, Ms. Hammon filled
out and signed a battery affidavit in which she wrote: “Broke our Furnace
& shoved me down on the floor into the broken glass. Hit me in the chest
and threw me down. Broke our lamps & phone. Tore up my van where I
couldn’t leave the house. Attacked my daughter.”75 Like McCottry, Ms.
Hammon did not appear at trial, and the court admitted the affidavit under
the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule and her
statements to officers as excited utterances.76
In considering these cases together, the Supreme Court declined again
“to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements—
or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation—as
either testimonial or nontestimonial.”77 The Court held:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.78
Applying this standard to the cases under consideration, the Court
concluded that the Davis 911 call was not testimonial, while the Hammon
affidavit was.79
Of the Davis call, the Court said, “McCottry was speaking about events
as they were actually happening, rather than ‘describ[ing] past events,’”
and that the 911 operator asked questions that were “necessary to be able
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 818.
Id. at 819.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 820.
Id.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id. at 829–32.
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to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in
Crawford) what had happened in the past.”80 By contrast, of the Hammon
statements and affidavit, the Court said, “it is entirely clear from the
circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into
possibly criminal past conduct—as, indeed, the testifying officer
expressly acknowledged.”81 Thus, the two cases—factually similar in
terms of the domestic violence victim’s plight—had distinct outcomes
under the Crawford test.
2.

Lab Reports

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court extended its
Confrontation Clause test into a new arena, considering a certificate from
a state crime lab certifying the contents and quantity of a cocaine sample.82
Speaking, again, through Justice Scalia for a five-person majority, the
Court noted that the case “involves little more than the application of our
holding in Crawford,” and held that the certification from the crime lab
was an “ex parte out-of-court affidavit” that triggered the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine.83 In a dissent, Justice Kennedy
raised the practical problems with such an application, focusing on the
technical complexities of forensic work in the real world:
Consider how many people play a role in a routine test for the
presence of illegal drugs. One person prepares a sample of the
drug, places it in a testing machine, and retrieves the machine’s
printout—often, a graph showing the frequencies of radiation
absorbed by the sample or the masses of the sample’s molecular
fragments . . . . A second person interprets the graph the machine
prints out—perhaps by comparing that printout with published,
standardized graphs of known drugs. Meanwhile a third person—
perhaps an independent contractor—has calibrated the machine
and, having done so, has certified that the machine is in good
working order. Finally, a fourth person—perhaps the laboratory’s
director—certifies that his subordinates followed established
procedures.84
(The authors of a major casebook seem to agree, referring to MelendezDiaz as “an astonishing elevation of form over both substance and good

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 827 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 829.
557 U.S. 305 (2009).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 332 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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sense.”85)
The organizational complexities of the laboratory setting became
relevant in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, where the prosecution attempted
to introduce a forensic lab report containing a testimonial certification of
blood alcohol level (BAC) from one scientist through the in-court
testimony of another scientist, who had not signed the original
certification.86 This variation on the Melendez-Diaz facts did not change
the outcome; the Court (speaking this time through Justice Ginsburg,
joined in full by Justice Scalia and in large part by Justices Thomas,
Sotomayor, and Kagan) held that once a particular scientist had certified
a test, that scientist became a witness the defendant had a right to
confront.87 In a notable concurrence, Justice Sotomayor set the stage for
eventual limitation to the Crawford revolution, noting that four issues had
not been decided in Bullcoming. Those issues were whether the outcome
would have been different if: (1) the state suggested an alternate primary
purpose, such as medical treatment, for the BAC report; (2) the state’s
witness had been a lab supervisor or reviewer; (3) the state had introduced
an expert witness and asked for their independent opinion about the
underlying testimonial reports (a common form of expert testimony
permitted under the evidentiary rules governing experts); or (4) the state
had introduced only machine-generated results.88
The qualifications in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence seemed to come
to fruition a year later in Williams v. Illinois,89 a fractured, 4–4–1 ruling
that has introduced even further confusion to the constitutional standing
of lab reports under the Sixth Amendment.90 Williams considered a fairly
specific factual scenario. In a rape trial, the State of Illinois called a
forensic specialist who testified that a DNA profile—produced by an
outside, private laboratory called Cellmark—matched a profile produced
by the state crime lab using a sample of the defendant’s blood.91 The state
expert testified that Cellmark was an accredited lab and had provided the
police with a DNA profile.92 The expert further testified that notations on

85. RONALD J. ALLEN, JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, DEBRA A. LIVINGSTON, ANDREW D. LEIPOLD &
TRACEY L. MEARES, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1416 (5th ed. 2020).
86. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 651 (2011).
87. Id. at 652.
88. Id. at 672–74 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
89. 567 U.S. 50 (2012).
90. See Stuart v. Alabama, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 36, 36 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the Williams decision “yielded no majority and its various opinions have sown
confusion in courts across the country”).
91. Williams, 567 U.S. at 62–63.
92. Id.
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documents (admitted at trial as business records) stated that vaginal swabs
taken from the victim were sent to and received back from Cellmark.93
Essentially, the expert was able to testify to the fact that a sample taken
from his own lab matched the profile taken from Cellmark.
The plurality (authored by Justice Alito and joined by Justices Breyer,
Roberts, and Kennedy, with Justice Thomas concurring only in the
judgment) held that the Cellmark report was not testimonial for Crawford
purposes as it “plainly was not prepared for the primary purpose of
accusing a targeted individual.”94 Rather, the Court found, “the primary
purpose of the Cellmark report, viewed objectively, was not to accuse
petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial” but to “catch a dangerous
rapist who was still at large.”95 Relevant to the plurality’s holding was the
fact that “no one at Cellmark could have possibly known that the profile
it produced would turn out to inculpate petitioner—or for that matter,
anyone else whose DNA profile was in a law enforcement database.”96
Essentially, the Cellmark report’s anonymity rendered it, from the
perspective of the plurality, non-testimonial.
Furthermore, the plurality took up one of the potential issues raised by
Justice Sotomayor in her Bullcoming concurrence: the fact that Rule 703
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, governing expert opinion testimony,
permits experts to explain the facts on which their opinions are based
without testifying to the truth of those facts.97 The plurality found that the
crime lab technician’s testimony about the Cellmark report fell into this
category.98 It is important to note, however, that given the fractured
opinions, five of the nine justices on the Williams court actually disagreed
with the plurality’s reasoning: Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, agreed
with the four dissenters (Justices Kagan, Scalia, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor) that Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence would not
allow “backdoor” use of a testimonial, expert report, as the expert’s
opinion would not be relevant unless the underlying assertions in the
testimonial hearsay report were true.99
Nonetheless, observers have understood the Williams case as an
attempt by some members of the Court to check the potential forward roll

93. Id.
94. Id. at 84.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 84–85.
97. Id. at 77–78 (citing FED. R. EVID. 703); see also Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647,
673 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
98. Williams, 567 U.S. at 77–80.
99. See id. at 105–07 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 126–27 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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of Crawford over all forensic scientific evidence.100 The consequences of
such widespread exclusion would be particularly devastating in rape cases
(like the case in Williams) in which the nationwide backlog of rape kit
testing has left countless victims without justice.101 Forensic investigation
is often slow, and very frequently, the only way to catch rapists involves
years-long gaps between comparisons like the one made between the
Cellmark profile and the sample the State of Illinois took from the victim.
The ways prosecutors have dealt with the impact of Crawford on forensic
reports will be addressed in the next section. For now, it is sufficient to
observe that Williams is difficult to reconcile with Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming, which turned entirely on the reports’ testimonial nature, as
opposed to the ostensible reliability the Court identified in the Williams
report, which was based on the anonymity of the process employed.
The last major addition to the Crawford line of cases managed to
confuse the state of the law even further. In Michigan v. Bryant,102 also
decided in 2011, the Court considered a case in which police had
questioned a victim who was dying of gunshot wounds. The victim stated
that “Rick” shot him and explained that he had spoken with the defendant
Bryant through the back door of the defendant’s house.103 The victim
testified that Bryant shot him through the door after he turned to leave and
that the victim then drove to a nearby gas station where he was later
questioned by police.104
While Bryant arguably could have been resolved, consistent with
Crawford, by applying the dying declaration exception (as noted in the
Crawford footnote),105 Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Bryant Court,
announced what is in fact a very different test. The Court referred to the
“ongoing emergency” language in Davis, suggesting that “implicit in
Davis is the idea that because the prospect of fabrication in statements
given for the primary purpose of resolving that emergency is significantly
diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to
be subject to the crucible of cross-examination.”106 The Court then
compressed that idea back into the logic of common law exceptions to

100. See DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL
RULES TO THE COURTROOM 740–41, 754–55 (5th ed. 2021).
101. See Gaby Lion, Note, Bringing Untested Rape Kits out of Storage and into the Courtroom:
Encouraging the Creation of Public-Private Partnerships to Eliminate the Rape Kit Backlog, 69
HASTINGS L.J. 1009, 1033–34 (2018).
102. 562 U.S. 344, 348 (2011).
103. Id. at 349.
104. Id.
105. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
106. Bryant, 562 U.S. at 361.
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hearsay, noting that “[t]his logic is not unlike that justifying the excited
utterances exception in hearsay law.”107
Holding that the victim’s statements were not testimonial, the Court
reformulated the “ongoing emergency” test to encompass not only the
ongoing emergency for which the victim sought assistance, but also the
broader ongoing emergency to which the police were responding (in this
case, the possibility of a dangerous, armed criminal at large).108 The
Bryant Court described the relevant inquiry as incorporating both the
purposes for which the declaration was made and the purposes for which
it was received by the police officer.109 Dissenting, Justice Scalia stated
that only “the declarant’s intent is what counts” and decried the majority’s
attempt to improperly use the officer’s perspective to justify
characterizing the declarant’s statements about Bryant as made to resolve
an ongoing emergency.110
Commentators have despaired of making sense of the morass left by
Crawford and its progeny, especially since Bryant.111 But one thing is
clear: the Crawford path, which started as an attempt to vindicate a
confrontation right that was not protected by common law hearsay rules,
was largely unmade by Bryant, which refocused the analysis back on the
general reliability of statements. As the next section summarizes, the
tension between recognizing a specific confrontation right, distinct from
background hearsay law, and ameliorating the pragmatic consequences of
doing so, has occupied an inordinate amount of jurisprudential and
scholarly thought in the years since Crawford.

107. Id.
108. Id. at 364.
109. Id. at 367.
110. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. See generally Epstein, supra note 3. There has, at least, been one unanimous Confrontation
Clause decision since Bryant, in Ohio v. Clark. 576 U.S. 237 (2015). Clark considered the
admissibility of a three-year-old child’s statements to her teacher identifying her mother’s boyfriend
as the abuser of his infant sister and him. Id. at 242. Writing for a six-Justice majority, Justice Alito
applied the “primary purpose” test and, while declining to adopt a categorical rule excluding all
statements made to people other than law enforcement from the reach of the Sixth Amendment, held
that “considering all the relevant circumstances” the child’s statements were “not made with the
primary purpose of creating evidence for Clark’s prosecution” and, thus, there was no violation. Id.
at 246. In a concurrence Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, attacked the majority’s contention
that the primary purpose test is “merely one of several heretofore unmentioned conditions . . . that
must be satisfied before the Clause’s protections apply” and emphasized, contrary to the majority,
that it is the government’s burden, not the defendant’s, to prove a long-established practice at the time
of the Founding of prosecutors introducing specific kinds of evidence, such as dying declarations. Id.
at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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Scholarly Debate and Practice

In response to the sea change in forensic testimony created by
Crawford, many states have introduced so-called “notice-and-demand”
statutes, which require that the defendant be allowed to “demand” the
presence of a particular expert at trial or otherwise waive that right.112 In
dicta in Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court seemed to endorse such
statutes as constitutional.113 Yet state courts have remained divided on the
further question of whether an expert witness on the stand may rely upon
an otherwise inadmissible testimonial report, as suggested by the plurality
in Williams.114 The soundness of such a potential justification has been
heavily contested.115 In a seeming violation of Bullcoming, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces allowed a laboratory
scientist to testify about the contents of a report on a rape kit prepared by
an absent colleague (which was not, itself, admitted as evidence) because
the testifying expert conducted a sufficiently “independent analysis,” as
opposed to being merely a “conduit” for the report’s contents.116
Some commentators suggest that Bryant has left the jurisprudence
surrounding eyewitnesses even less clear than the jurisprudence
surrounding lab reports, because the “primary purpose” test is so deeply
fact-specific and therefore unpredictable.117 As Michael Pardo notes, the
strange effect of this is that, despite Crawford’s grounding in originalism,
the sorts of cases the Founders would have been most concerned about
(accusatory statements from potential witnesses) may have more potential

112. Ivana Deyrup, Note, Causing the Sky to Fall: The Legal & Practical Implications of
Melendez-Diaz, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE, https://harvardlpr.com/online-articles/causing-thesky-to-fall-the-legal-practical-implications-of-melendez-diaz/ [https://perma.cc/CPP9-2P4U].
113. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 326–27 (2009) (noting “[i]n their simplest
form, notice-and-demand statutes require the prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its
intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial, after which the defendant is given a period of time
in which he may object to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst’s appearance live at trial”
and that “[t]here is no conceivable reason why [the defendant] cannot . . . be compelled to exercise
his Confrontation Clause rights before trial”).
114. See People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 333 (Cal. 2016) (holding that the Confrontation Clause
bars the admission of testimonial hearsay through an expert); State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 666
(N.J. 2014) (“We find Williams’s force, as precedent, at best unclear.”); Commonwealth v. Brown,
185 A.3d 316, 340 (Pa. 2018) (Donohue, J., concurring) (failing to resolve the question, in a 3–3
split); State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 68 (Tenn. 2014) (“The Supreme Court’s fractured decision in
Williams provides little guidance and is of uncertain precedential value.”); United States v. James,
712 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Turner, 709 F.3d 1187, 1189 (7th Cir. 2013).
115. See Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the
Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 117–38.
116. United States v. Katso, 74 M.J. 273, 275–82 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
117. Michael S. Pardo, Confrontation After Scalia and Kennedy, 70 ALA. L. REV. 757, 780–81
(2019).
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paths to admissibility than does the testimony of DNA analysts, unknown
to the Founders.118 The practice in the area, thus, remains uncertain, and
the precise limitations of the Confrontation Clause remain foggy.119
Mark Spottswood has suggested a tiered, misconduct-based approach
to the Confrontation Clause, which would allow for suppression of prior
statements where the witness could have testified or where their
unavailability was the fault of either the prosecution or the witness
themselves. This approach would make it harder to falsely accuse others
without facing perjury charges.120 Spottswood has argued that suppression
does more harm than good in cases where the witness becomes
unavailable through no fault of their own, because there would be no
misconduct to deter and we have no reason to believe that the jury would
give radically greater credence to the out-of-court statement than to an incourt statement.121 If those things are true, Spottswood argues, there is no
reason to deprive jurors of potentially valuable information.122
With three new Justices—Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett—
replacing Scalia, Kennedy, and Ginsburg since the last of the Crawford
cases, the next Confrontation Clause case the Court takes up will be an
opportunity to provide much-needed clarity. In his dissent from the denial
of certiorari in Stuart v. Alabama, Gorsuch criticized the plurality’s
reasoning in Williams.123 Stuart was a drunk driving case in which the
State of Alabama introduced a BAC report prepared by one analyst

118. Id. at 783.
119. With respect to expert reports, at least, Ronald Coleman and Paul Rothstein provide a useful
distillation of the six possible ways forensic reports could come in without violating the Confrontation
Clause under Melendez-Diaz and its progeny. See Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstien, A Game
of Katso and Mouse: Current Theories for Getting Forensic Analysis Evidence Past the Confrontation
Clause, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 27, 52–55 (2020). First, if the report were not testimonial (i.e., if it
were a medical or psychiatric report not prepared for the prosecution). Id. at 52. Second, if it were
used, as the Williams plurality suggests, as a foundation for expert testimony and not for the truth of
the matter contained in it, a strategy which five justices in Williams rejected and Justice Gorsuch
seemingly rejected in Stuart. Id. at 52–53. Third, where the report is not specifically accusatory (the
other theory of the Williams plurality based on the anonymity of the Cellmark test, also a shaky theory
given the views of the other justices at the time). Id. Fourth, where the report lacks sufficient formality,
which were the grounds on which Justice Thomas concurred in Williams given the lack of certification
on the Cellmark report. Id. at 54. Fifth, where the testifying witness is more than a mere “surrogate”
or “conduit” for the report because, as in Katso, they had sufficient authority in the lab that the report’s
“entire analysis can be sufficiently tested by cross-examining the testifying expert.” Id. Sixth, where
a notice-and-demand statute exists and demand is not made, seemingly approved in dicta in MelendezDiaz. Id. at 55.
120. Spottswood, supra note 18, at 569.
121. Id. at 569–70.
122. Id. at 570.
123. Stuart v. Alabama, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 36, 36–37 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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through the testimony of a second.124 The state argued that the report
should be admissible on the grounds that it was not offered for the truth
of what it said about the defendant’s BAC at the time of the test, but rather
to provide the testifying expert with a basis for estimating the BAC at the
time the defendant was driving.125 Gorsuch pointed out, approvingly, the
five votes against this logic in Williams itself, and characterized the Stuart
case as one where “[t]he engine of cross-examination was left unengaged,
and the Sixth Amendment was violated.”126 Gorsuch suggested
Alabama’s position was illogical, noting that the sole point of offering the
BAC report would be to show “because of the report’s truth . . . a basis
for the jury to credit the testifying expert’s estimation of Ms. Stuart’s
blood-alcohol level hours earlier.”127 This seems to suggest that Gorsuch
will replace Justice Scalia as a Crawford purist. What this means for the
somewhat equivocal test introduced by Bryant—authored, as it was, by
Justice Sotomayor, who joined Justice Gorsuch in his dissent from
certiorari denial in Stuart—remains to be seen.
The Supreme Court has yet to adequately keep the promise it made in
Crawford to provide a definition of “testimonial” on “another day.” While
Crawford itself provided mostly historical comparisons resulting in a
vague, formalistic understanding of the Confrontation Clause, the later
cases seem to focus again on the accuracy/reliability values ostensibly
held inadequate in Crawford. To resolve this puzzle, the next Part
identifies an important, overlooked constitutional value, beyond accuracy,
that has been implicit in the confrontation right from the very start.
II.

CONFRONTATION AS A DIGNITARY INTEREST

This Part considers the confrontation right as a potential dignitary
interest of criminal defendants. In so doing, it turns to one of the
foundational narratives behind Confrontation Clause discourse—the trial
of Sir Walter Raleigh. In identifying the key features of Raleigh’s
influential attack on the absence of his accuser from the proceedings, it
identifies the aspects of the episode that establish dignity as a basis for the
confrontation right as it exists in Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.
This analysis will help courts identify the dignitary principles of justice
embodied in the right of confrontation and untangle the thorny caselaw
Crawford has generated.

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37 (emphasis in original).

Sheley (Do Not Delete)

2022]
A.

3/25/2022 9:35 PM

DIGNITARY CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

227

Sir Raleigh’s Trial and the Rhetoric of Dignity

Although he is perhaps most famous to history as a favorite of Queen
Elizabeth I, and for the failed English settlement he established off the
coast of Virginia on Roanoke Island,128 Sir Walter Raleigh was a major
character in the development of common law hearsay. Both an asset to the
treasury and a diplomatic liability for his repeated piracy of Spanish ships,
Raleigh found himself on shaky ground at court during the reign of
Elizabeth’s successor, James I.129 In 1603, he was arrested and charged
with treason for his alleged involvement in a plot against King James.130
The Crown’s chief evidence against him was the signed and sworn
confession of Raleigh’s friend Henry Brooke, 11th Baron Cobham,131 who
at one point even recanted his allegations, though he eventually reasserted
them.132 Over Raleigh’s numerous, eloquent protests, Cobham did not
appear on the witness stand for cross-examination, and Raleigh was
ultimately convicted and sentenced to death.133
Raleigh’s trial has become a foundational narrative grounding the
Anglo-American common law of hearsay and, in the United States, the
Confrontation Clause. In a 1919 speech before the Royal Historical
Society commemorating the Raleigh trial, Edwardian jurist Harry L.
Stephen declared, “if I have to admit that English administration of justice
grossly failed on this occasion there can be no doubt that the reaction was
immediate and that . . . the essential features of what we consider justice
in such matters were gradually developed on consistently progressive

128. Agnes M.C. Latham, Sir Walter Raleigh, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Oct. 25, 2021),
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Walter-Raleigh-English-explorer [https://perma.cc/Q8FNS3B7].
129. Id.
130. Id. The plot was an alleged conspiracy among Protestant English noblemen to remove the
Catholic James I and replace him with his cousin Lady Arbella Stuart. See Sara Jayne Steen, The
Correspondence of Lady Arbella Stuart, BODLEIAN LIBR., http://emlo-portal.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/col
lections/?catalogue=arbella-stuart [https://perma.cc/59Z8-9A4C].
131. See Latham, supra note 128; ANTHONY J.H. MORRIS, THE QUATERCENTENARY OF SIR
WALTER RALEIGH’S TRIAL 13 (2003).
132. MORRIS, supra note 131. The prosecution also introduced additional hearsay evidence through
the testimony of a boat pilot named Dyer, who asserted that in Lisbon a “Portugal gentleman” had
told him “your King shall never be crowned, for Don Cobham and Don Raleigh will cut his throat
before he come to be crowned.” Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, reprinted in 1 CRIMINAL TRIALS 400,
436 (David Jardine ed., 1832).
133. After his conviction, the silver-tongued Raleigh managed, at first, to talk his way out of the
Tower on the argument that he could locate the mythological El Dorado (the “lost City of Gold”) in
South America. See Latham, supra note 128. Failing in that search, Raleigh did succeed, however, in
angering the Spanish by raiding their South American settlements. This further raised the ire of the
pacifist King James and the executioner’s block finally awaited Raleigh upon his return. Id.
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lines.”134 Perhaps due to the centrality of the Raleigh trial in the
development of these “essential features” of common law justice, many
American evidence and criminal procedure textbooks introduce these
topics by discussing Raleigh’s trial and contain excerpts from his speeches
in his defense in which he decried Cobham’s absence from the courtroom
to provide face-to-face testimony.135 The Crawford court devotes two
paragraphs to the Raleigh trial, which it describes as one of “[t]he most
notorious instances of civil-law examination.”136 A Lexis search of U.S.
caselaw for the term “Raleigh” in the same sentence as “confrontation”
yields 195 hits,137 and in the same sentence as “hearsay,” it yields ninetytwo.138 As such, this episode in legal history was relevant not only to the
development of the confrontation right due to the actual legal reforms it
encouraged in its own time, but to the shape it has given the discourse
around confrontation to the present day.
Starting from the moment it concluded and stretching into the present
day, then, Raleigh’s trial became an important cultural narrative across
time. Philosophers and literary scholars have theorized the process
through which cultural narratives solidify into what can be termed the
“mythology” of a culture.139 Stories that become cultural mythology and,
as such, endowed with particular demands on human obedience are at first
necessarily products of particularized points of view and priorities. (One
classic example of a legal story that has achieved mythic narrative

134. Harry L. Stephen, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh: A Lecture Given in Connection with the
Raleigh Tercentenary Commemoration, in 2 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 172, 176
(1919).
135. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 360–62 (2d ed. 2008).
136. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004).
137. Case Results for “Raleigh w/s confrontation”, LEXIS+, https://plus.lexis.com/search
/?pdmfid=1530671&crid=2f51376a-2199-45c3-bca5-2897ba84be1c&pdsearchterms=raleigh+w%2
Fs+confrontation&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdstartin=&pdpsf=
&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=s8ttk&earg=pdsf&prid=23a554dc-3ec1-4f90-a6ea088acf4d806a (type “Raleigh w/s confrontation”; then choose “Cases” from the Content dropdown;
click “search”) (last visited Jan. 20, 2022).
138. Case Results for “Raleigh w/s hearsay”, LEXIS+, https://plus.lexis.com/search
/?pdmfid=1530671&crid=28a3227e-579a-48d1-aa7d-29143e760916&pdsearchterms=Raleigh+w%
2Fs+hearsay&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdstartin=&pdpsf=&pdq
ttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=fphg&earg=pdsf&prid=b2da6624-bb4f-4bc1-9b08fe0b54c033d9 (type “Raleigh w/s hearsay”; then choose “Cases” from the Content dropdown; then
click search”) (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
139. For example, Ernst Cassirer argues thoughts, at the time of emotional excitement, become
concentrated and objectified into what the mind perceives as a god or demon; he notes that “the
manner of this concentration always depends upon the direction of the subject’s interest, and is
determined not so much by the content of the experience as by the teleological perspective from which
it is viewed.” ERNST CASSIRER, LANGUAGE AND MYTH 44 (Susanne Langer trans., Dover
Publications 1953) (1946).
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standing in American jurisprudence is the familiar case of Vosburg v.
Putney,140 a tussle between two schoolboys that has become shorthand for
the powerful idea that a tort or criminal defendant remains liable for the
extent of damages even when the victim has a so-called “eggshell
skull.”141 In the case of the Confrontation Clause, the impact of Raleigh’s
particular point of view, as memorialized in his oft-cited trial transcript,
has developed cultural mythological force in the collective legal debate
over what, precisely, is at stake in the right of confrontation. Common
law’s cumulative nature allows stories like Vosburg’s and Raleigh’s to
retain power, throughout centuries of jurisprudence, as archetypes for the
rules they represent.142 By identifying the particulars of an archetype, we
may discern more precisely the nature of the claims to justice it makes.
Most significantly, Raleigh’s courtroom speeches focus on two
interrelated values offended by the absence of Cobham: accuracy and
dignity. Raleigh returns to both of these, individually and separately,
throughout his trial. With respect to accuracy, he points out the obvious
about his accuser: “Cobham is absolutely in the king’s mercy; to excuse
me cannot avail him. By accusing me he may hope for favour.”143
Cobham’s motives for lying and Raleigh’s inability to cross-examine him
about them create the most important problem of accuracy in the
proceeding. We would now say that a witness’s sincerity (or lack thereof)
counts as one of the four “testimonial capacities,” which it is the purpose
of in-person cross-examination to probe.144 In the case of Baron Cobham,
this capacity for sincerity would seem questionable under the shadow of
Tower Hill.
Yet Raleigh repeatedly couches his concerns about accuracy in the
140. 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891).
141. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 6 (8th ed. 2004) (describing
Vosburg as “one of the most storied cases of American law”).
142. Northrop Frye, developing a system of literary archetypes, notes that “the search for
archetypes is a kind of literary anthropology, concerned with the way that literature is informed by
pre-literary categories such as ritual, myth and folk tale. We next realize that the relation between
these categories and literature is by no means purely one of descent, as we find them reappearing in
the greatest classics.” Northrop Frye, The Archetypes of Literature, in THE MYTH AND RITUAL
THEORY 223 (Robert A. Segal ed., 1998). While Frye focuses on religious mythology such as that of
the Greek pagans, his basic point holds true for the full range of cultural mythology: once a
mythological archetype has been established, it becomes iterative, validated, and replicated across a
range of textual sources. Frye proposes that we can “see literature, not only as complicating itself in
time, but as spread out in conceptual space from some unseen center.” Id. Frye’s “unseen center”
supplies a theory for why Raleigh recurs so frequently as a jurisprudential and pedagogical archetype
in Confrontation Clause discourse. Id.
143. The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh: A Transcript, MATHEW LYONS, https://mathewlyons.co.uk/
2011/11/18/the-trial-of-sir-walter-ralegh-a-transcript/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2022).
144. See FISHER, supra note 135, at 363 (noting that the four testimonial capacities include
perception, memory, sincerity, and narrative).
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language of dignity, a connection made most clear in his exclamation:
“[b]y the law of God . . . the life of man is of such price and value, that no
person, whatever his offence is, ought to die, unless he be condemned on
the testimony of two or three witnesses.”145 In specifying “whatever his
offence is,” Raleigh seems to extend his criticism of the system even to
cases where the defendant is in fact guilty, on the basis of the defendant’s
innate dignity measured against the light weight of a single testimony.146
(Purely utilitarian accuracy concerns would, in theory, be triggered only
if an innocent person were convicted due to unreliable testimony.) Raleigh
seems to anticipate the Kantian conception of human dignity as an end
rather than a means. In hypothetical cases with guilty defendants, the
concern is, by definition, not accuracy. It is therefore relevant that Raleigh
separately attacks the manner in which the ex parte system mobilized
written testimony to operate upon a defendant’s intrinsic human worth,
even beyond accuracy concerns.
Throughout his trial speeches Raleigh reiterates the asymmetry
between the dignitary value of his life and the comparative insubstantiality
of words. At the start of the trial, he states, “[y]our words cannot condemn
me; my innocency is my defence. I pray you go to your proofs.”147 He
implies that Cobham’s written words, alone, are not proof.148 After being
formally accused of treason, he responds, “[y]our phrases will not prove
it.”149 And after the clerk reads Cobham’s confession, Raleigh exhorts:
gentlemen of the jury, I beseech you hear me. This is absolutely
all the evidence that can be brought against me. Poor shifts! This
is that which must either condemn me or give me life, which must
free me or send my wife and children to beg their bread about the
streets. This is that must prove whether I am a notorious traitor,
or a true subject to the King. But first let me see my accusation,
that I may make my answer.150
In all these instances, Raleigh deplores the flimsiness of the written
word, which he reduces to its constituent, immaterial parts by describing
it as “phrases” and “shifts.” Against those he sets up an embodied, highly
material image of himself in the context of marriage and fatherhood.
Finally, in one of the most-quoted moments from the trial, he declares:
“Good my lords, let my accuser come face to face and be deposed. Were

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, supra note 143.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the case but for a small copyhold, you would have witnesses or good proof
to lead the jury to a verdict; and I am here for my life!”151 Again he
compares the value of his human life and the value of something
materially transient: a tenure of land.152 But he also renders Cobham as an
embodied form—a human “accuser” who he wants to meet “face to face.”
He further emphasizes Cobham’s human existence in declaring, “[i]f my
accuser were dead or abroad, it were something. But he liveth, and is in
this very house!”153 By insisting on the shared living, human embodiment
of both himself and Cobham, he underscores the fact that it is the lack of
a human, face-to-face encounter that threatens his dignity in this
proceeding for his own life.
Consistent with this trial’s subsequent afterlife as a vehicle for
procedural reform, Raleigh also continually emphasizes the systemic
indignities to English justice created by the lack of confrontation. He
refers to his own legal research of English law prior to the Marian statutes,
which he says required at least two witnesses to convict someone of
treason.154 The change, he suggests, represents a sharp break from the
traditions of English law, rendering England indistinguishable from its
rival, Spain, and its brutal inquisitory practices:
[I]f the wisdom of former times, the assemblies of all the three
estates in several parliaments thought it just to have the accusers
produced, surely you will not withhold my accuser? If you
proceed to condemn me by bare inferences, without an oath,
without a subscription, without witnesses, upon a paper
accusation, you try me by the Spanish inquisition.155
He also links the prior, English common law to Biblical authority:
Yet the equity and reason of those laws still remains, they are still
kept to illustrate how the common law was then taken and ought
to be expounded; but howsoever that may be, the law of God, I
am sure, liveth for ever; and the canon of God sayeth, “At the
mouth of two or three witnesses shall he that is worthy of death
be put to death; but at the mouth of one witness he shall not be
put to death.”156
By making these comparisons, Raleigh situates the confrontation right
151. Id.
152. A copyhold is “a former tenure in land in England and Ireland by right of being recorded in
the court of the manor.” Copyhold, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/copyhold [https://perma.cc/4RV6-Y6QH].
153. The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, supra note 143.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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in a broader historical discourse about the “rights of Englishmen” as a
form of exceptionalism, a discourse that traces its origins to the Magna
Carta and would proceed well into the establishment of the English
Constitutional Monarchy and the Age of Reason (legible, again, in John
Adams’ complaints about the Stamp Act courts, discussed in section I.A,
supra).157 Certainly his point about English legal dignity was not lost on
at least one of his trial judges, Sir Francis Gawdy, who later observed,
“the justice of England has never been so degraded and injured as by the
condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh.”158
If the cultural-legal myth of Raleigh’s famous trial did indeed emerge,
at least in part, from his rhetorical focus on dignitary interests, it remains
to consider how, specifically, face-to-face confrontation realizes those
interests. In particular, we should be interested in the relationship between
such interests and the interests in accuracy with which both Raleigh and
our modern system of evidentiary and criminal procedural law associate
confrontation. The following sections will consider these questions.
B.

Emotional Guilt and Accuracy

At one point during his trial, Raleigh urged, “let Cobham be sent for;
let him be charged upon his soul, upon his allegiance to the King, and if
he will then maintain his accusation to my face, I will confess myself
guilty.”159 Raleigh’s demand makes the point, familiar to students of
evidence law, that one way to test an in-court witness’s testimonial
capacity for sincerity is through the administration of an oath, the
violation of which would result in damnation (or, at least, perjury
charges).160 The oath itself is one of several reasons why the laws of
hearsay generally enforce a preference for live testimony over out-ofcourt statements.161
Yet Raleigh’s words suggest another means of assuring accuracy and
preserving dignity, flowing not from the oath itself but specifically from
the embodied confrontation between accuser and accused: guilty
conscience. Raleigh wants Cobham to maintain his accusations “to his
face.” It is not merely the formal setting, the king, and God who would
ensure that Cobham would not lie on the stand. Raleigh’s dignitary

157. For a famous eighteenth-century example of this discourse, see EDMUND BURKE,
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 27 (1790), https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/
ugcm/3ll3/burke/revfrance.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ3U-D4A8].
158. Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, supra note 132, at 487.
159. The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, supra note 143.
160. See FISHER, supra note 135, at 363–64.
161. Id.
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interest in being treated as a human being by his accuser might also extract
honesty through that accuser’s own human tendencies. That, for Raleigh,
dignity has distinct value from accuracy is clear in his purported
willingness to confess himself guilty, should he only have the opportunity
of face-to-face confrontation.
As to accuracy, there does seem to be psychological evidence that
confrontation may encourage honesty through the mechanism of
emotional guilt. First off, proximity and feelings of guilt appear
correlated: test subjects are much less likely to administer supposed
shocks to another party when that party is nearby as opposed to when they
do not have to observe it.162 More specifically relevant to a trial setting,
Battigalli, Charness, and Dufwenberg have shown how simple guilt may
provide a psycho-foundation for honesty in certain situations.163
Generally, people have an aversion to lying, the more so the lower the
costs to themselves and the higher the harms imposed on others.164 Further
research on parties playing games with high monetary payoffs suggests
that a party feels guilty when their counterparty has in some way failed to
meet their own expectation—meaning that they feel guilt when their
counterparty is surprised by the game’s outcome.165 Battigalli et al. have
integrated this research to apply guilt to the context of honesty, showing
that the data supports the claim that people are more likely to lie when
they are failing to meet the expectations of a listener.166 While these are
all controlled studies (with stakes far lower than Raleigh’s trial, which
implicated the potential execution of both parties), they suggest a
mechanism by which a witness’s proximity to the defendant could induce
honesty through guilt, particularly in cases where the defendant knows the
witness is lying.
There is another way in which the dignitary value of face-to-face
confrontation could have simultaneous accuracy benefits, which were not
relevant in the case of Raleigh himself. As discussed above, all criminal
defendants have a right to assist in their defenses, a right which has both
accuracy and dignity components. In cases where it is unclear even to the
defendant whether the witness is lying, it becomes relevant whether a
defendant’s face-to-face confrontation with a witness adds accuracy to the

162. See generally Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to
Authority, 18 HUM. RELS. 57 (1965).
163. Pierpaolo Battigalli, Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, Deception: The Role of Guilt, 93
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 227, 231–32 (2013).
164. See Uri Gneezy, Deception: The Role of Consequences, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 391 (2005).
165. See Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, Guilt in Games, 97 AEA PAPERS & PROC.
170, 173–74 (2007).
166. See Battigalli et al., supra note 163, at 229.

Sheley (Do Not Delete)

234

3/25/2022 9:35 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:207

defense. (This was not the case in Raleigh’s trial where, presumably,
whatever the truth to Cobham’s testimony was, Raleigh already knew it.)
One of the specters the psychological literature raises for criminal trials
generally is that people are not particularly good at telling when others are
lying, a problem of great significance given the importance the common
law system puts on jurors as arbiters of credibility.167 For example,
onlookers to bargaining processes are poor at detecting which party is
lying.168 Yet Frank, Gilovich, and Regan have found that players of
prisoner’s dilemma who meet face-to-face beforehand are much more
likely to predict other parties’ cooperative behavior and thus conclude that
players involuntarily send one another truth signals.169 This study suggests
that there may be at least some basis for the belief that a defendant can
better assist counsel by evaluating adverse witnesses face-to-face, at least
where the defense does not already know whether the witness is lying.
That said, the stakes of prisoner’s dilemma, in which there is a chance of
benefitting both parties through telling the truth, are very different from
the typical criminal trial, particularly trials where the witness avoids
punishment (like Cobham) by lying.
This literature review suggests that there may indeed be at least some
accuracy value to a defendant’s face-to-face confrontation of their
accuser, above and beyond the enhanced protections of the oath and the
fire of cross-examination. Yet these studies do not provide overwhelming
evidence and do not specifically consider the judicial setting. It therefore
remains fairly inconclusive whether the accuracy protections of face-toface encounters guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause add enough to
the existing accuracy protections of hearsay law to justify Crawford’s
substantial costs. Furthermore, these accuracy benefits to face-to-face
confrontation would seem to apply equally to any witness, not merely
those whose out-of-court statements were specifically testimonial and
thus governed by Crawford. Nonetheless, a lying witness’s feelings of
guilt may have yet further relevance to this analysis, beyond their role in
increasing accuracy.
C.

Confrontation as a Relational Right
The preceding section collected evidence of what may seem an

167. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) (quoting United States v. Barnard,
490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973)).
168. See generally Axel Ockenfels & Reinhard Selten, An Experiment on the Hypothesis of
Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining, 33 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 90 (2000).
169. See Robert H. Frank, Thomas Gilovich & Dennis T. Regan, The Evolution of One-Shot
Cooperation: An Experiment, 14 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 247, 255–56 (1993).
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intuitive concept: dishonest witnesses may experience feelings of guilt
after giving false testimony while face-to-face with the defendant. Thus,
the confrontation right may mobilize those feelings to enhance the
accuracy of a proceeding. This section will invert this proposition to
consider whether the defendant should have an affirmative personal right
to expose their accuser to such feelings of guilt. In other words, it takes
seriously Raleigh’s promise that he would confess himself guilty of
crimes he emphatically denied committing, if only given the dignity of
confronting Cobham face-to-face. I argue that, because a potentially
innocent defendant’s dignity is affronted by a witness’s State-facilitated
lies, such a defendant has a dignitary interest in imposing, through
physical proximity, reciprocal costs on his false accuser, which is
heightened in cases where the initial lie was made in a setting created or
controlled by the State.
1.

Dignity and Deception

According to Kant’s Formula of Humanity, the use of force, coercion,
and deception are morally wrong because they treat a human being as a
means to an end, insofar as they render impossible the conditions of
consent.170 As will be discussed in greater detail in the broader discussion
of dignity in Part III below, Kant viewed proportional punishment not as
coercion but as a means of respecting the human dignity of a perpetrator—
of treating a person “as an end in himself.”171 For the same reasons that
he endorsed retributive punishment, he abhorred the punishment of the
innocent, even through non-penal means such as war.172 Furthermore,
Kantian ethics forbid lying insofar as deception does not respect the
rationality of the person lied to, a view which has been criticized as
excessively absolutist under circumstances in which lies could be
considered necessary to avoid a greater harm.173
If one takes Kant’s claims about the relationship between dignity and
lies at face value, however, they create an interesting ethical triangle in
cases where an innocent defendant is threatened with punishment due to
the dishonesty of a state’s witness. In such a scenario, one could argue,
the witness—in lying to the state (via the judicial tribunal)—unethically
uses it as a means to a personal end, an outcome that would be forbidden
170. IMMANUEL KANT, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, reprinted in BASIC
WRITINGS OF KANT 143, 164–97 (Allen W. Wood ed., Thomas K. Abbott trans., 2001).
171. Id. at 185.
172. IMMANUEL KANT, To Eternal Peace, reprinted in BASIC WRITINGS OF KANT 433, 433–40
(Allen W. Wood ed., Carl J. Friedrich trans., 2001).
173. See Christine M. Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil, 15 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFS. 325, 325–26 (1986).
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by Kant’s ethics, in which a state is “a society of men, which no one but
they themselves is called upon to command or to dispose of.”174 (To use
George Mason’s words in his attack on ex parte tribunals under the Stamp
Act, the defendant would be treated as an end by the “sycophant[s] and
informer[s].”175) The state, essentially, will have acted not through the
reasoned deliberation of its constituents, but through the lying witness’s
coercive deception. At the same time, however, the innocent defendant’s
individual human dignity is affronted by the state action that, through the
witness’s lie, imposes unwarranted punishment on an innocent.
Of course, in designing legal rules, there is no way to tell, ex ante, who
is guilty and who is innocent; indeed, it is an important American
Constitutional value that both the guilty and the innocent retain absolute
procedural rights against the state. In that sense, positive moral theories
such as Kantian ethics, keyed as they are to substantive right and wrong,
prove less than useful (though Kant himself was concerned with due
process as well, as a buttress against unlimited state coercion.176) What
the Kantian conception of deception highlights, however, is how a lie that
weaponizes the state against an innocent (which is, of course, perjury as a
legal matter) undermines that innocent’s human dignity in a way that
should subject the witness to proportional retribution. Yet in cases where
the lie is successful, perjury charges are unlikely to follow.
In light of the essentially epistemological problem with relying on
criminal sanctions for perjury as a punishment, the witness’s potential
guilt over lying—heightened, if psychology has it correctly, due to
proximity to the defendant—could serve at least some sort of retributive
function of its own. In this manner of thinking, the lying witness’s guilt
serves the innocent defendant’s dignity, however imperfectly. (In the
reverse situation, in which the witness is honest and the defendant is
guilty, there is neither cause for guilt nor the need to restore dignity, so
the case drops out.)
This retributive function matters more in cases where a potential outof-court statement qualifies as “testimonial” because in those cases, the
speaker deploys the apparatus of the state against the defendant for a
personal motivation. An investigation and prosecution is, necessarily, a
usurpation of a defendant’s freedom and, therefore, an affront to inherent
dignity, albeit an unavoidable one. A defendant’s dignitary interest in
confronting such accusers is, therefore, heightened relative to their
interest in confronting a witness who lies to a private party.

174. KANT, supra note 172, at 436.
175. See ROWLAND, supra note 49, at 383.
176. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 82 (1979).
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In short, while a witness’s guilt over lying face-to-face with a defendant
may have benefits for the accuracy of the proceeding, it seems even more
clear that this potential for guilt serves the dignitary interest of the
defendant, through their relation to the lying witness. Put another way, the
possibility of guilt allows the defendant some form of agency through the
mere embodied assertion of the defendant’s own humanity and its
potential effects on the lying witness. It is this embodied, human
encounter that Raleigh—a nobleman well used to dignified treatment
beyond what most of today’s criminal defendants receive—repeatedly
demanded in his famous courtroom rhetoric. This is a non-trivial value
and benefit, given that the enormous, systemic resource imbalance
between the defense and the prosecution generally leaves defendants with
little or no agency.177
2.

Lab Technicians as a Case Study

The testimony of lab technicians is particularly salient, not only due to
the number of Supreme Court cases that deal with it, but because such
cases provide a vivid example of the dignitary harms a defendant suffers
when unable to confront lies told within the state-funded apparatus of a
police investigation. Consider, for example, a defendant convicted on the
strength of a lab report produced by an ill-run, prosecution-biased state
crime lab. If lab technicians may “testify” impersonally by means of
written affidavit, not only is it easier for mistakes to render the
proceedings inaccurate without the benefits of defense cross-examination,
but the dignitary harm to the defendant’s personhood is even greater.
Where the crime lab witnesses participate in the general, impersonalized
apparatus of prosecution, the defendant’s ability to personally encounter
the human witness, susceptible to feeling guilt, at least somewhat
enhances the defendant’s personal agency in an otherwise largely
impersonal, state-driven process.
As discussed in Part I, many critics of Melendez-Diaz and its progeny,
with their widespread practical implications for the criminal justice
system, share Justice Kennedy’s “immediate systemic concern” that the
Melendez-Diaz Court failed to “acknowledge the real differences between
laboratory analysts who perform scientific tests and other, more
conventional witnesses.”178 For the Melendez-Diaz dissenters, it was
dispositive that lab technicians, unlike the witnesses and victims in

177. See generally BRYAN FURST, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., A FAIR FIGHT: ACHIEVING INDIGENT
DEFENSE RESOURCE PARITY (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201909/Report_A%20Fair%20Fight.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XNB-NZS2].
178. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Crawford and Davis, did not attempt to testify to “personal knowledge of
some aspect of the defendant’s guilt,” which should have—in the views
of the dissent and other critics—created a convenient place to draw a line
limiting the reach of Crawford.179
What this account leaves out, however, is that regardless of whether a
technician possesses personal knowledge of the defendant’s actions, their
testimony is, like that of any other fact witness, nonetheless based on
personal knowledge of the physical evidence of a crime which they have
personally handled (unlike the paradigmatic expert witness who may
testify about hypotheticals and background information). Furthermore, a
lab technician’s personal capacities for sincerity, accuracy, and so forth
are no less relevant when their correct identification of a substance, DNA
sequence, etc., make up the “words” (as Raleigh would have put it) upon
which a citizen’s life and freedom rest. Most importantly from a dignitary
perspective, the State solicits and funds the reports of lab technicians—
even those in private labs, like Cellmark in the Williams case. Lies in such
reports therefore compound the dignitary harm the prosecution inflicts on
a defendant, insofar as they allow private actors to deploy the artillery of
the state to use the defendant for their personal ends.
Both the accuracy and dignitary implications of lab tech testimony
became abundantly—and tragically—clear during the recent
Massachusetts scandal in which the misconduct of two state crime lab
chemists produced two of the largest mass exonerations in history.180 One
chemist in the Boston lab, Annie Dookhan, admitted that in order to meet
the personal goal of being “the hardest working and most prolific and most
productive chemist,” she achieved three times the productivity of her
colleagues by simply failing to test most of the samples she received,
instead automatically concluding that they were controlled substances.181
Dookhan’s strategy emphasizes how even the best-run drug labs contain
an inherent structural bias: they are run by the state and it is always in the
state’s interest that any given sample come up positive.182 For dishonest

179. Id.
180. See Andrea Estes, Almost a Decade After Annie Dookhan and the State Drug Lab Scandal,
the Fallout Is Growing, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 2, 2021, 12:41 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/
01/01/metro/nearly-decade-after-annie-dookhan-state-drug-lab-scandal-fallout-is-growing/ [https://
perma.cc/27MM-F5Z2].
181. See Katie Mettler, How a Lab Chemist Went from “Superwoman” to Disgraced Saboteur of
More Than 20,000 Drug Cases, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ne
ws/morning-mix/wp/2017/04/21/how-a-lab-chemist-went-from-superwoman-to-disgraced-saboteurof-more-than-20000-drug-cases/ [https://perma.cc/X432-9S2K/].
182. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RSCH.
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 24
(2009).
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lab techs looking for advancement, this creates a significant moral
temptation.
Dookhan’s email correspondence with prosecutors emphasizes how
tightly her personal identity was bound up with being, rather than a neutral
scientist, an arm of the prosecution. In one message, she tells the
prosecutor to “[t]ell the defendant, he is getting an extra 5 years for
p[issing]-off the chemist. :)”183 In another, she responds to a prosecutor’s
expressed desire to process more drug offenders before summer by
agreeing: “I have the same attitude. get them off the streets.”184 Dookhan
would ask prosecutors for permission before responding to defense
requests and once expressed her identification with the prosecution and
police by quipping, “[g]reat business we all work in huh?”185 Prosecutors
seemed to appreciate Dookhan’s efforts and made it clear that they
regarded her as on their side. One Assistant District Attorney
enthusiastically wrote her, “DREAM TEAM!!!!!!!!! It is time to kick
some more buttocks!!!!”186 Another, in asking that certain tests be run
quickly, emphasized to her that the defendants are “VERY bad guys,”
thereby inappropriately assuming the defendants’ guilt before Dookhan
had even run her experiments.187
Perhaps even more disturbingly, Dookhan’s self-conception as a hardworking arm of the state appears to have implicated not only her
professional but her personal identity. Despite being married, she engaged
in unprofessional communications with prosecutor George Papachristos.
In their emails, Dookhan and Papachristos both used the context of how
hard they were working to lament their respective needs for romantic
attention. Papachristos noted that he needed to “meet[] the right girl,”188
and Dookhan said that she wanted a man to “love me and make me laugh
and smile.”189 Dookhan went so far as to fake and forward to Papachristos
a phony email exchange with another colleague purporting to show that
colleague telling Dookhan that she worked too hard and therefore
“need[ed] a boyfriend,” erroneously referring to Dookhan being recently
divorced.190
It is irrelevant whether Dookhan was attempting to shore up her
183. How to Fix a Drug Scandal: Episode 2, NETFLIX, at 30:30–30:40 (2020),
https://www.netflix.com/watch/80999612 (last visited Jan. 31, 2022).
184. Id. at 31:22.
185. Id. at 30:50.
186. Id. at 31:06.
187. Id. at 31:55.
188. Id. at 36:56.
189. Id. at 34:58.
190. Id. at 33:23.
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professional standing with the District Attorney’s office by appearing
sexually available to a particular powerful prosecutor, or whether she was
attempting to pursue an actual romantic attraction under the guise of
playing up her (fraudulent) identity as hyper-productive chemist. The
bottom line is that Dookhan was using the lives of the defendants whose
cases she touched (or failed to touch) as a means to an end of a highly
personal slate of benefits. There could be no greater affront to the dignity
of these defendants than an individual citizen empowered to deploy the
prosecutorial function of the state to make use of them in this manner.
The second big Massachusetts drug lab scandal involved Amherst tech
Sonja Farak, who was arrested in 2013, a year after Dookhan.191 Farak’s
case was rather different from Dookhan’s, insofar as Farak does not
appear to have intentionally produced positive results for the prosecution,
nor did she simply fail to test samples.192 She did, however, confess to
having been regularly high on a number of controlled substances she
obtained from the lab while doing her job between the years 2004 and
2013. These substances included methamphetamine, cocaine, LSD, and
crack.193
Because Dookhan’s and Farak’s criminal official misconduct took
place both before and after the Melendez-Diaz decision, there does not
appear to be data readily available as to how many of the cases they were
involved in were resolved through trials during which they “testified” via
affidavit (as opposed to trials during which they testified in person or
through plea agreements). What we do know, however, is that between
Dookhan’s and Farak’s cases, 38,000 Massachusetts drug cases have been
overturned in total.194 The efforts to overturn these convictions offer
specific victim narratives that couch the harm suffered by criminal
defendants in dignitary terms.
The dignitary harm of Farak’s misconduct was emphasized by
Herschelle Reaves, a mental health care coordinator who had pled guilty
to possession of a class B substance in 2008 while Farak worked in the
relevant crime lab. When the ACLU sued the Massachusetts Attorney
General on behalf of the Farak defendants, Reaves affirmed in an affidavit
191. Estes, supra note 180.
192. Kelly Wynne, Here’s What Happened to Sonja Farak After “How to Fix a Drug Scandal,”
and Where She Is Now, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 1, 2020, 10:35 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/hereswhat-happened-sonja-farak-after-how-fix-drug-scandal-where-she-now-1495337 [https://perma.cc/
8E5E-YGG9].
193. See generally How to Fix a Drug Scandal, supra note 183.
194. Tom Jackman, Prosecutors Who Covered up Mass. Drug Lab Scandal Now Face Bar
Discipline, Civil Rights Lawsuit, WASH. POST (July 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
crime-law/2019/07/30/prosecutors-who-covered-up-mass-drug-lab-scandal-now-face-bar-discipline
-civil-rights-suit/ [https:/perma.cc/SL7Z-WRRC].
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that she would not have entered that plea had she known of the misconduct
in the drug lab.195 But she also notes how her own work as an organizer—
as opposed to merely her experiences as a defendant—affect her
understanding of the effects of the criminal justice system on Black
women such as herself.196 She further notes:
In 1974, My mother Arlene Gladden-Reaves became the first
woman, as well as the first Black woman, to serve as an officer in
the Springfield Police Department. I was 8 years old. During her
tenure as the “First Woman,” I saw my mother endure brutal
racism, sexism and classism. Watching her deal with those
hardships while I was just a young child gave me a full
understanding of how the justice system can be stacked against
people of color.197
These observations do not attack the accuracy of Reaves’s plea—as
Farak herself observed at her trial, her results were not challenged for so
many years because most defendants already knew if the substance they
had been arrested for was, in fact, a narcotic, and so they had no reason to
do so.198 Reaves does not allege that she would have been acquitted had
she taken the case to trial and been able to challenge the accuracy of the
lab results. Rather, she contextualizes the wrong she experienced within a
context of systemic bias that started with her own mother’s experiences
with racism as a Springfield police officer. In other words: her affidavit
focuses on the dignitary wrongs of having been convicted in a system she
was unaware involved a drug-addicted chemist whose word would have
been accepted over hers at trial.199
Nothing about Reaves’s case would necessarily have come out
differently if she had known she would have a right to cross-examine the
relevant lab tech in person at trial—nor, granting Farak’s cynical (yet
logically plausible) view of defendant incentives—would anything
necessarily change about most Massachusetts drug lab cases. Ninety-six
percent of criminal cases end in plea agreements and never reach trial, in
195. Affidavit of Herschelle Reaves at 3, Comm. of Counsel Servs. v. Attorney General, 108
N.E.3d 966 (Mass. 2018) (No. SJC-12471).
196. Id. at 1–2.
197. Id.
198. How to Fix a Drug Scandal, supra note 183, at 48:28.
199. Note that the Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor’s duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense does not apply to impeachment
evidence in cases where the defendant signs a plea bargain. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622
(2002). So here, even if the prosecution had been aware of Farak’s drug abuse, it would not have been
obligated to disclose this information to the defense. This means that the opportunity for the few
defendants who do go to trial to cross-examine repeat actors like crime lab scientists is particularly
important.
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part due to the strength of the cases prosecutors have against defendants
they threaten to take to trial, and in part due to the terrible stakes even
innocent indigent defendants face when they choose to stand trial with
only the assistance of an overworked public defender. These risks are
compounded by the wide ranges of potential sentences defendants face
under the statutory definitions of most crimes, which give prosecutors
plenty of leeway for negotiation.200 Beyond that, it is hard to imagine how
likely it would be for even a highly paid defense attorney to be able to
investigate thoroughly enough to turn up strong enough evidence of
wrongdoing in state crime labs and “break” bad actors like Dookhan and
Farak, Perry Mason-style, on the witness stand.
Yet trials are forced to serve as bellwethers for the rest of the system;
their outcomes drive the parties’ evaluations of their incentives during the
plea process.201 Indeed, a common justification for why it is okay for 95%
of defendants to waive their trial rights through plea deals is that they do
so in the “shadow” of likely outcomes at constitutionally sound trials.202
Surely this makes it even more important, with all of the dignitary
problems the system already causes, for courts to ensure that defendants
get the full dignitary and accuracy benefit of their confrontation rights in
the very few trials that do occur!
The case of the Massachusetts drug labs highlights how the highly
personal motivations of individual lab techs—be it ambition, romance, or
addiction—can and do impact the veracity of their testimony. For such
testimony to avoid cross-examination would affect not only the accuracy
of the outcome, but the inherent dignity of the defendant. Bad lab techs
made use of defendants’ lives and bodies, through the formal apparatus of
the state, to serve these highly personal ends. The right to confront such
lying and unreliable lab witnesses face-to-face, with the potential for
causing them emotional guilt, gives defendants a reciprocal personalized
agency against the self-interested apparatus improperly deployed against
them.
3.

Confrontation and Interpretive Authority

Pulling back a bit from the specific case of lab technicians to the
general idea of a dignitary interest in confrontation, another question
arises. Even if one accepts the possibility of a dignitary value at stake in
the Sixth Amendment, is it not a rather narrow constitutional interest if it
can only be realized in cases where the witness feels actual guilt as a result
200. See Stuntz, supra note 22, at 2568.
201. Id. at 2548.
202. Id.
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of face-to-face confrontation? Apart from the possibility that
accomplished liars may not feel any guilt at all,203 other inaccurate
witnesses may not lie intentionally and, therefore, believe themselves to
be telling the truth. As it turns out, even in those cases, an understanding
of the defendant as an active participant in and interpreter of the crossexamination provides a basis for a dignitary understanding of the
confrontation right.
Returning to Walter Raleigh, who was, of course, acting as his own
counsel, it is noteworthy that throughout the proceedings, he insisted upon
himself as a textual participant in the law, as a meaning-generating reader.
As discussed above, Raleigh researched both the legal and Biblical
authorities stipulating that the testimony of one witness should not be
enough to convict a defendant of a capital crime and gave his opinion as
to the meaning of those authorities. Beyond that, the narrative Raleigh
develops throughout his trial speeches integrates his own interpretations
of the law into his personal narrative about Cobham as an unreliable
witness. While Raleigh’s agency as an author of legal truth-claims was
heightened because he was acting as both counsel and defendant, his trial
nonetheless demonstrates the defendant’s potential dignitary right to
participate directly in the meaning-generating process of a courtroom
examination, even simply by observing it.
The criminal trial in an adversarial system has long been understood to
create epistemological problems.204 While the trial produces official legal
“truth,” it necessarily does so by collecting the fractured, subjective
accounts of individual witnesses and subjecting them to the “crucible” of
cross-examination by opposing parties.205 Although the ultimate jury
verdict constitutes “official,” objective legal truth, it may not always track
with “actual,” factual truth (as in the cases of wrongful convictions or
exonerations). And even in cases where the verdict is “right,” it may
nonetheless occlude the important subjective truths contained in an
individual’s testimony (in a case, for example, where a rape victim is
“correctly” convicted for killing their assailant years after the fact, but
where their individual testimony contains a narrative of justification that
is “truthful,” though not recognized at law).
So-called “law and literature” scholarship has helped to shed light on
the ways in which the epistemological possibility of multiple “truths”

203. See Kristin Choo, Perjury with Conviction: Lawyers Can Use Strategic Tactics at Trial to
Expose Pathological Liars on the Witness Stand, 85 A.B.A. J. 71, 71 (1999).
204. See Mirjan Damaška, Epistemology and the Legal Regulation of Proof, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY
& RISK 117, 117 (2003).
205. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
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complicates legal fact-finding, particularly in hard cases.206 Scholars of
law and narrative point to how the rise of the novel as a literary genre,
with its multiple points of view, demonstrated to eighteenth and
nineteenth-century audiences how multiple characters could give
differing accounts of the same events, with no clear unitary “truth”
emerging to the reader (sitting, implicitly, as fact-finder).207 This literary
innovation appears to have had at least some discernible impact on the
development of specific evidentiary rules—for example, eighteenthcentury reforms to the old common law treatment of a rape victim’s
“reputation” as stable, legally knowable, and relevant to the existence of
consent.208
These insights show how a defendant’s own narrative of events is a
relevant source of truth. They also underscore the dignitary aspects of the
defendant’s right to testify under oath in their own defense. These rights
became recognized through reforms removing the old common law bar on
a defendant serving as their own sworn witness.209 What has been less
discussed is the defendant’s dignitary interest in acting as the “reader”
rather than the “author”—as the engaged interpreter of the testimony of
other witnesses. German critic Wolfgang Iser, credited with founding the
“reader-response” school of literary criticism, argues that a literary work
is not an object in and of itself but an effect on the implied reader who is
the required audience for the text.210 Iser’s point was most obvious in
206. See Linda Myrsiades, Review: Law and Literature, 21 COLL. LITERATURE 164 (1994)
(reviewing DANGEROUS SUPPLEMENTS: RESISTANCE AND RENEWAL IN JURISPRUDENCE (Peter
Fitzpatrick ed., 1991); LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE (Robert Post ed., 1991); RICHARD
WEISBERG, POETHICS, AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE (1992); and JAMES BOYD
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990)).
207. See LISA RODENSKY, THE CRIME IN MIND: CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE VICTORIAN
NOVEL (2003); TONI BOWERS, FORCE OR FRAUD: BRITISH SEDUCTION STORIES AND THE PROBLEM
OF RESISTANCE, 1660–1760 (2011); ALEXANDER WELSH, STRONG REPRESENTATIONS: NARRATIVE
AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN ENGLAND (1992); SANDRA MACPHERSON, HARM’S WAY:
TRAGIC RESPONSIBILITY AND THE NOVEL FORM (2010); AYELET BEN-YISHAI, COMMON
PRECEDENTS: THE PRESENTNESS OF THE PAST IN VICTORIAN LAW AND FICTION (2013).
208. As I have argued elsewhere, Samuel Richardson’s 1748 novel Clarissa exposed the circularity
of the particular common law rule admitting hearsay-like ‘general’ reputation evidence while
excluding testimony about specific facts. ERIN SHELEY, CRIMINALITY AND THE COMMON LAW
IMAGINATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES 164–74 (2020). Specifically,
Richardson shows the gap between immediate, individual points of view and public “fame,” which
we get only third-hand through reports from letter writers on conversations they had had with
characters the reader never directly accesses. Id. Clarissa’s struggle to protect both her physical bodily
integrity and her socially-constructed reputation demonstrates the epistemological incoherence of
generalized reputation evidence serving as legal proof against rape. Id. Ultimately, by dramatizing the
separate and only partially overlapping realities of reputation and particular fact, Richardson calls into
question the heightened legal relevance of the former in rape cases. Id.
209. See Langbein, supra note 35, at 282.
210. See generally WOLFGANG ISER, THE IMPLIED READER (1972).
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literary texts with specifically unreliable narrators, such as Henry James’s
Turn of the Screw. While Iser’s work may seem relevant primarily to
literary critics working in the Ivory Tower, it impacted not only literary
criticism, but also theological criticism. Some critics of the New
Testament—a document with law-like claims for those who recognize it
as the word of God—came to believe that the reader should be active, not
passive, in creating Biblical meaning.211
If the claims of reader-response theory have a role in Biblical
interpretation, elevating the interpretive perceptions of the individual
ostensibly subject to the “Word” of the text, they seem equally relevant to
a defendant’s point of access to the “Word” of the witness who would
condemn them. Stanley Fish said that Iser’s scholarly project was “no less
than to free the literary text from the demand that it yield or contain a
referential meaning, an embodied truth,”212 with the effect of enhancing
the dignity of the human being.213 Reader-response theory suggests that
there is a dignity inherent in a personal point of interpretive access to any
sort of text that makes an external claim on an individual. Raleigh’s
historical importance to our current understanding of the Confrontation
Clause started with his active participation in the legal texts relevant to his
trial and with assertions that his lack of access to a particular text—the
testimony of Lord Cobham in real time—was an affront to both the trial’s
accuracy and his personal dignity.
When a declarant gives a testimonial statement out of court, some arm
of the State is, by its very nature, the intended audience, whether it be a
police officer taking a statement or the notary taking the lab tech’s
affidavit in a state-initiated ritual of solemnization. Indeed, the existence
of a State audience is precisely what makes the statement testimonial
under Crawford. One concept of dignity assumes that “a person’s identity
and worth depend on his relationship to society.”214 Where the State acts
as the sole “reader” of a statement that will be used to convict a defendant,
this asymmetry does harm to a defendant’s dignity.
It should be obvious that a defendant merely observing a testifying
witness—assuming that witness does not experience guilt at lying in front
of the defendant—may provide no accuracy benefit in terms of the
outcome of the trial. Unlike a reader of a book (even, depending on one’s
211. Stephen D. Moore, Negative Hermeneutics, Insubstantial Texts: Stanley Fish and the Biblical
Interpreter, 54 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 707, 716 (1986).
212. Stanley Fish, Why No One’s Afraid of Wolfgang Iser, in THE COMMUNICATION THEORY
READER 407 (Paul Cobley ed., 1996).
213. See Jonathan Culler, Stanley Fish & the Righting of the Reader, 5 DIACRITICS 26, 29 (1972).
214. Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183,
188 (2011).
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theological views, the Bible), a defendant cannot change the jury’s
interpretation of testimony simply by interpreting it in their own way. Yet
many already-recognized dignitary rights of defendants track accuracy
interests in some cases while failing to serve them in others. For example,
a defendant’s right not to appear in court in prison garb may serve to
remove a jury’s inaccurate bias against the defendant, or it may not. A
defendant’s right to self-representation may allow them to do a better job
than a state-appointed counsel would, but in many cases it may very much
do the opposite. Courts still recognize these dignitary rights even when
they part ways with accuracy.
The defendant’s proposed Sixth Amendment dignitary interest in
acting as an original “reader” of a witness’s testimony is structurally
similar. A defendant already has a right to participate in their own
defense—a right generally assumed to promote accuracy because the
defendant may understand the facts of the case better than their counsel
does. Yet even in cases where, given the facts, that may not turn out to be
true, there remains a dignitary valence to the defendant’s right to be
present during the State’s presentation. That dignitary interest is
compromised where the State alone has been the sole intended audience
for an out-of-court testimonial statement that will ultimately be used at
trial. The next Part will pursue these comparisons further by discussing
the dignitary confrontation right within the context of other dignitary
interests already recognized in our constitutional jurisprudence.
III. DIGNITY AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Thus far, we have examined the dignitary confrontation interest in
isolation from broader jurisprudential debates about the general nature of
dignity. This discussion brought to light the ways in which confrontation
serves the defendant’s dignity interest, distinct from their interest in
accuracy. Such observations, however, arise in the midst of a much bigger
philosophical conversation as to what “dignity” is, as a constitutional
value, in the first place. This Part lays out that debate and suggests how a
dignitary understanding of the Confrontation Clause harmonizes with the
Supreme Court’s recognition of dignity in other criminal procedural
contexts.
While “dignity” became a prominent feature of rights discourse only in
the mid-twentieth century, heavily associated with post-World War II
constitution-building and international law instruments,215 it has actually
215. See G.P. Fletcher, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, 22 U.W. ONT. L. REV. 171, 171
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been present since the Founding. Thus, dignity is highly relevant to any
originalist reading of the Sixth Amendment, like Scalia’s in Crawford.
Thomas Paine spoke of “the natural dignity of man,” which has been read
as a repudiation of the Burkean view of dignity as the product of social
rank.216 The Founders drew on Paine’s views of dignity, with Thomas
Jefferson asserting that “the dignity of man is lost in arbitrary distinctions
based on ‘birth or badge’”217 and Alexander Hamilton describing a
constitutional democracy as the “safest course for your liberty, your
dignity, and your happiness.”218 While he did not use the term “dignity”
explicitly, George Mason echoed these dignity-based objections to
arbitrary, state-enforced distinctions between citizens in his letter to the
committee of London merchants opposing the Stamp Act, excerpted in
Part I. He declared that enforcing the Act through ex parte interrogatories
created “an odious distinction between us and our fellow-subjects residing
in Great Britain.”219 Mason’s choice of words suggests that hanging in the
balance of the confrontation issue was the very status of the American
colonials as citizens and subjects of the Crown, identities which the
disparate treatment threatened through the potential arbitrary predations
of “every sycophant and informer.”220 These objections turn on dignity,
insofar as they implicate the manner in which a person’s value is
recognized by others and by the state.
As Neomi Rao writes, “[t]he type of dignity that a society protects is
part of how a community defines itself—how individuals belong to the
community and how the state must act to respect human dignity.”221 At a
time when the American colonies were just about to define themselves for
the first time, Mason’s dignitary concerns about the Stamp Act
prosecutions seem particularly relevant. While a thorough philosophical
account of dignity is beyond the scope of this Article, this section provides
a brief account of dignity as an American constitutional value and, most
importantly, of the specific dignitary interests of criminal defendants
recognized by American courts.

(1984); Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 848 (1983);
Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into
Criteria and Content, 27 HOW. L.J. 145 (1984).
216. See Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 200 (2011)
(citing THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 41 (Gregory Claeys ed., Hackett Publ’g Co., 1992) (1791–
1792)).
217. THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 575, 587 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
218. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 14 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
219. ROWLAND, supra note 49, at 383.
220. Id.
221. Rao, supra note 214, at 270.
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The Nature of Dignitary Interests

According to Kant, “that which constitutes the condition under which
alone anything can be an end in itself, this has not merely a relative worth,
i.e. value, but an intrinsic worth, that is dignity.”222 Kant’s famous
“categorical imperative” is to treat our own and others’ humanity as an
end in itself and never as a means.223 He writes that “[w]hatever has a
value can be replaced by something else which is equivalent; whatever,
on the other hand, is above all value, and therefore admits of no
equivalent, has a dignity.”224 This underscores the irreducible nature of
dignity and other rights, whose “existence does not depend on the good
consequences that follow from their exercise.”225
Kant became popular as a legal philosopher in the 1980s, perhaps in
reaction to the prevailing vogue of utilitarianism.226 Yet explicit “dignity”
talk had emerged quite a bit earlier, with the wave of international human
rights conventions in the years after World War II. Most prominently, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “all human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights.”227 Since then, dignity has repeatedly
emerged throughout American constitutional jurisprudence to justify
outcomes in contexts as disparate as abortion,228 free speech,229 and
222. Kant, supra note 170, at 192 (emphasis in original). Kant’s Fundamental Principles appeared
just four years before the U.S. Constitution in 1785, and it is therefore possible that the Founders
would have been aware of some of his ideas, which were circulating in the same general
Enlightenment public sphere. Kant was enthusiastic about the American Revolution, see Lewis W.
Beck, Kant and the Right of Revolution, 32 J. HIST. IDEAS 411, 411 (1971), and made offhand
reference in his writings to secession violating the U.S. Constitution. IMMANUEL KANT,
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 120 (M. Gregor ed., 1996) (1785). Certainly, the Founders’ conceptions
of inalienable rights seem compatible with Kant’s categorical imperative. See generally C. Ellsworth
Hood, Kant on Inalienable Rights, in AKTEN DES SIEBENTEN INTERNATIONALEN KANT-KONGRESSES
325 (Manfred Kleinschnieder & Gerhard Funke eds., 1991). Yet it is difficult to find any concrete
evidence of any of the Founders reading him and, indeed, we know that as of 1797 John Adams had
not. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams (Oct. 25, 1797),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-12-02-0158
[https://perma.cc/2HXX-697W]
(asking his son about “a misterious Phenomenon in Germany by the Name of Kant”). Thus, it would
not be wise to treat Kant as relevant to an originalist reading of the Sixth Amendment but, instead, as
providing a framework for dignity rights that has become relevant in modern jurisprudence.
223. Kant, supra note 170, at 194–95.
224. Id. at 192.
225. Fletcher, supra note 215, at 173.
226. Id. at 171.
227. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
228. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
229. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (noting the hope “that use of such
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welfare benefits.230
Yet as many scholars have pointed out, the concept of “dignity” has not
retained a consistent meaning throughout the case law and commentary;
indeed, its very slipperiness demonstrates the wide variation of potential
conceptions of human rights generally within and across communities.231
Examples such as the legality of prostitution and physician-assisted
suicide show how proponents of both sides of certain divisive issues may
each invoke dignity to advance their arguments.232 Some commentators
have even argued that dignity is amorphous enough to be philosophically
meaningless for the purposes of recognizing specific individual rights.233
It is clear, however, that the Supreme Court heavily utilizes the concept
of dignity in arriving at constitutional holdings: in the past 220 years,
Supreme Court Justices have invoked the term in more than 900
opinions.234 Indeed, in a 2011 empirical survey, Leslie Henry found that
“conservative” and “liberal” justices appeared to use the term equally
often,235 and that the use of the term in majority opinions has increased
over time at a statistically significant rate.236 Of course, these numbers
show only that as a descriptive matter—despite the skeptics—dignity is
alive and well as a basis for Supreme Court decision-making. Only a
closer look at how the Court uses the term can illuminate the precise
constitutional values it captures.
Several scholars have attempted to impose order on the concept of
dignity by identifying the various understandings of the term appearing in
case law and other materials. In one such study, Leslie Henry rejects

freedom [of expression] will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and
in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice
upon which our political system rests”).
230. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970) (explaining that “[f]rom its
founding the Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons
within its borders”).
231. See Rao, supra note 214, at 186; Henry, supra note 216, at 172; Erin Daly, Human Dignity in
the Roberts Court: A Story of Inchoate Institutions, Autonomous Individuals, and the Reluctant
Recognition of a Right, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381 (2011); Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in
Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2006); Benjamin F. Krolikowski,
Brown v. Plata: The Struggle to Harmonize Human Dignity with the Constitution, 33 PACE L. REV.
1255 (2013).
232. See Henry, supra note 216, at 175 n.30, 222.
233. See Ruth Macklin, Dignity Is a Useless Concept, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 1419, 1419 (2003); John
Harris, Cloning and Human Dignity, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 163, 163 (1998); Helga
Kuhse, Is There a Tension Between Autonomy and Dignity?, in 2 BIOETHICS AND BIOLAW 61, 72
(Peter Kemp et al. eds., 2000).
234. See Henry, supra note 216, at 178.
235. Id. at 172.
236. Id. at 179.
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earlier reductivist and essentialist approaches by philosophers that have
tried, but failed, to impose a unitary meaning on the term.237 She argues
that dignity is better understood in practice rather than in the abstract and
should therefore be understood to have multiple different, if related,
meanings depending on the context in which it is used.238 She identifies
five distinct meanings:
1. Institutional status as dignity (once used to justify the Burkean
conception of dignity attached to rank and now most frequently used by
the Court to justify the doctrine of sovereign immunity).239
2. Equality as dignity (the idea of dignity as universal and arising from
shared humanity, and frequently invoked by the Court in antidiscrimination cases).240
3. Liberty as dignity (the Kantian/Lockean idea of dignity as derived
from autonomy, associated with American political liberalism and used
by the Court to protect individual choices in contexts such as abortion and
same-sex relationships).241
4. Personal integrity as dignity (the dignity Aristotle associated with
human excellence—exemplified by virtues such as deliberation, wisdom,
self-respect, courage, and self-control—which is capable of being reduced
through one’s own actions or from external interference, as when a person
is “robbed of [their] dignity” by unconstitutional police intrusions like
unannounced entries).242
5. Collective virtue as dignity (a communal dignity concerned with how
a society values the totality of human life, invoked as a criticism of torture
and lesser police practices that still “shock the conscience,” and also as a
justification for bans on prostitution, on the theory that sex work is an
affront to women’s “collective dignity”).243
Like Henry, Neomi Rao rejects a unitary meaning of dignity and
divides the concept into distinct legal usages, though finds only three
important types from the case law.244 The first category is “intrinsic
dignity,” which focuses on “human potential” rather than the realization
of such potential.245 This concept includes most negative liberties from
state interference and arises in cases involving freedom of speech,
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 177.
Id. at 182–86.
Id. at 190–99.
Id. at 199–205.
Id. at 206–12.
Id. at 212–20.
Id. at 220–29.
See Rao, supra note 214, at 186–92.
Id. at 187.
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privacy, and freedom from interference in sexual relations.246 The second
category includes “substantive” conceptions of dignity, which involve the
state making value judgments about the proverbial “good life.”247 This
conception of dignity “depends on specific ideals of appropriateness and
deems a person worthy or dignified to the extent that he conforms to such
ideals.”248 Laws prohibiting activities such as dwarf-tossing and
prostitution mobilize this understanding of dignity.249 Rao’s final category
conceives of dignity as a form of recognition. This dignity “is rooted in a
conception of the self as constituted by the broader community—a
person’s identity and worth depend on his relationship to society.”250 Rao
notes that central to this conception is the particular “attitude” toward an
individual expressed by the state and by other private parties.251 Examples
of dignity as recognition include laws against hate speech and defamation,
and the right to same-sex marriage (as opposed to civil unions), due to the
“expressive and symbolic” importance of marriage.252 Recognition
dignity also seems implicit in the presumption of innocence, which
prevents the state from changing the moral status of one of its citizens
without proof beyond a reasonable doubt.253
While this Article will not attempt its own typology, this previous
scholarship helpfully outlines the various ways in which dignity has
informed legal and especially constitutional values in American law. It
remains, to some extent, a moving target, particularly in the cases where
one view of dignity would urge a different outcome than another view. To
narrow the field of view a bit, the next section turns to the dignitary
interests the Court has recognized in the realm of constitutional criminal
procedure generally, and the trial rights of defendants specifically.
B.

The Dignitary Interests of Criminal Defendants

The Supreme Court has, periodically, recognized specific dignitary
interests when it comes to criminal defendants. We may think of the basic
fact of being a criminal defendant as intrinsically undignified to the extent
that, once in the criminal justice system, defendants lose many basic
negative rights against constraints on their liberty. Somewhat
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id. at 187–88.
Id.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 188–89.
Thanks to my colleague Kenneth Klein for this observation.
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counterintuitively, Kant believed that prosecuting wrongdoers
retributively—that is to say, only in strict accordance with the severity of
the harms they have caused—actually recognizes their human dignity by
treating them as rational beings and an end, rather than a means.254 The
non-individuated, mechanical reality of modern criminal justice,
however, seems hard to reconcile with almost any concept of human
dignity, particularly dignity as recognition.
Nonetheless, in several contexts, the Supreme Court has found
dignitary rights of defendants dispositive to the outcomes of constitutional
questions. It has held that the Fourth Amendment “guarantees the privacy,
dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts
by officers of the Government.”255 This includes the “dignity that can be
destroyed by a sudden [police] entrance.”256 The Court has held unlawful,
at least in part on dignitary grounds, bodily searches such as a compelled
surgery to remove a bullet257 and a forced stomach pump intended to
acquire evidence.258 In the Fifth Amendment context, the watershed
Miranda v. Arizona259 opinion stated that the constitutional foundation for
the privilege against self-incrimination was “the respect a
government . . . must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.”260
The Court has also found dignity to be one of the motivating principles
grounding the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. In Trop v. Dulles,261 which dealt with the constitutional limits
to forfeiture of citizenship, the Court held that “[t]he basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man.”262 Subsequent decisions have applied this dignitary reasoning to
criminal punishment in cases involving prisoner civil rights and the
application of the death penalty.263 Nonetheless, as prison reform activists

254. See Kant, supra note 170.
255. Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989).
256. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
257. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985).
258. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952).
259. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
260. Id. at 460.
261. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
262. Id. at 100.
263. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745 (2002) (holding that the Alabama Department of
Corrections’ treatment of its prisoners constituted cruel and unusual punishment and describing the
treatment as “antithetical to human dignity” where the plaintiff “was hitched to a post for an extended
period of time in a position that was painful, and under circumstances that were both degrading and
dangerous”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the execution of a mentally
disabled defendant violated the Eighth Amendment in light of then-existing “standards of decency”);
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and scholars have noted, in the Eighth Amendment context, the Court has
not fleshed out a clear conception of “individual dignity.” Decisions
considering prisoner civil rights claims often defer substantially to the
judgment calls of prison officials.264
Most relevant to our Confrontation Clause question, however, are the
cases involving dignitary interests at trial. The Court has recognized a
qualified right to self-represent that exists on both dignitary and utilitarian
grounds, even when those grounds are in opposition. In McKaskle v.
Wiggins,265 the Supreme Court said that “[t]he defendant’s appearance in
the status of one conducting [their] own defense is important in a criminal
trial, since the right to appear pro se exists to affirm the accused’s
individual dignity and autonomy.”266 (The Court noted, skeptically, that
self-representation could also “allow the presentation of what may, at least
occasionally, be the accused’s best possible defense,” but describes that
ostensibly dubious utilitarian benefit as a “distinct” objective from the
dignitary ones.267) Rao discusses the right to self-represent as an example
of both intrinsic dignity (respecting the defendant’s autonomy to make
choices free from state interference)268 and substantive dignity (noting that
the Court has limited the absolute right of self-representation in cases
involving mentally disabled defendants because the potential “spectacle”
of self-representation could itself, in these cases, be undignified).269
Similarly, Justices have recognized the criminal defendant’s due
process right not to appear before the jury in prison attire on dignitary
grounds distinct from parallel utilitarian ones. In Estelle v. Williams,270
Justice Brennan wrote: “Identifiable prison garb robs an accused of the
respect and dignity accorded other participants in a trial and
constitutionally due the accused as an element of the presumption of
innocence, and surely tends to brand [them] in the eyes of the jurors with
an unmistakable mark of guilt.”271
Justice Brennan clearly acknowledges the utilitarian argument against

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (reasoning that “[b]y protecting even those convicted
of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity
of all persons”).
264. See Shelby Calambokidis, Beyond Cruel and Unusual: Solitary Confinement and Dignitary
Interests, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1117, 1136 (2017).
265. 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
266. Id. at 178.
267. Id. at 177.
268. Rao, supra note 214, at 209.
269. Id. at 230 (citing Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008)).
270. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
271. Id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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prison garb: it is likely to increase the risk of inaccurate outcomes by
predisposing the jury to believe the defendant guilty. Yet the first,
separate, purpose he mentions—“respect and dignity”272 accorded to trial
participants—turns entirely on the defendant as an end themselves, as a
participant in his trial. It is a defendant’s constitutional right to receive the
recognition dignity of being treated, by the state and observers, with the
same respect as others in the room for the proceeding.
C.

Contextualizing a Dignitary Confrontation Clause

While dignity remains a fractured concept that courts recognize
somewhat inconsistently in adjudicating the rights of criminal defendants,
it nonetheless has several stable meanings. Moreover, it frequently serves
as a basis for the Supreme Court’s constitutional holdings. Furthermore,
the aspects of the confrontation right this Article identifies as dignitary fit
cleanly into several well-established conceptions of dignity.
Confrontation allows for a humanized, embodied meeting of defendant
and accuser, which enhances the defendant’s interpersonal agency. Such
confrontation is particularly important in cases of dishonest testimony,
where the defendant’s presence may impose a cost in guilt on the perjurer.
This is important not only for increasing potential accuracy, but as an
expression of the defendant’s moral worth as a human being. Finally,
confrontation allows the defendant the ability to be part of the present
audience for the adverse witness’s live testimony, as opposed to being
condemned by a testimonial statement made out-of-court to a state actor.
One conception of dignity implicated by these rights is dignity as
recognition, which George Mason invoked by complaining about the
“odious” distinction made by the Crown between Americans and other
British citizens through the use of ex parte interrogatories in the Stamp
Act cases.273 Recognition dignity “focuses on the unique and subjective
feelings of self-worth possessed by each individual and group.”274 While
Mason doubtless had utilitarian concerns on his mind when he wrote his
letter (the physical difficulty Americans would have in bringing evidence
in their defense if made to travel long distances to trial, and the risk of
losing their property due to the lies of self-interested “informers”),275 the
“odiousness” he attributes to the policy seems to come from the lack of
recognition of the shared community between colonists and other British
citizens.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
See ROWLAND, supra note 49, at 125.
Rao, supra note 214, at 189.
ROWLAND, supra note 49, at 129.
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While the distinction between Brit and colonist is obsolete, the idea that
a person’s sense of worth may depend on their relationship to society
remains highly relevant to criminal adjudication. The objectification
inherent in being processed by the State as a criminal defendant is always
an affront to recognition dignity, in some ways unavoidably, in other ways
that are compounded by the inadequacies and inequities in our actual
criminal justice system. Being convicted on the testimony of a witness
who has communicated with state actors only outside the courtroom is yet
another way in which a criminal defendant’s humanity can be negated.
This is true regardless of whether the witness is a spurned lover,
intentionally lying to the police, or a State-paid lab technician whose
potential for laziness, intoxication, or dishonesty may become hidden
behind a piece of paper, read into the record by another employee. In all
cases, the defendant has been deprived of their relational right of
confrontation: the right to assert the presence of their humanity against
the machinery of the State.
The relational conception of dignity developed here also shares a basis
in the notion of “personal integrity” as dignity, associated with Aristotle’s
theories of human excellence.276 Virtues like self-respect, deliberation,
and self-control are necessarily affronted when the State classifies a
person as a criminal defendant, especially through the accompanying
foreclosure, temporary or permanent, of all potential for accomplishment,
striving, human contact, or independent action. To the extent that the faceto-face confrontation between defendant and accuser facilitates selfrespect, deliberation, or any other human quality suppressed by the
criminal justice system, it fosters the dignity of personal integrity. At a
minimum, it may prevent the further degradation of these qualities that
arise when an accuser’s words of accusation fall, alone, on the ears of the
State, which musters those words against the defendant outside of their
presence.
Finally, as is true with all police and trial procedures applied to criminal
defendants, the confrontation right implicates the notion of “collective
virtue” as dignity. All criminal proceedings involve the restriction of a
defendant’s rights for the ostensible benefit of society as whole. While
out-of-court, un-cross-examined testimony may not quite “shock the
conscience” to the same degree as involuntary stomach pumping, our
collective virtue remains at stake in all trial processes that operate
unfairly.
In any case, it is not necessary to adopt a particular unitary definition
of dignity to see how the defendant’s relational right of confrontation

276. See Henry, supra note 216, at 212–20.
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harmonizes with several of the major categories already recognized by
courts. If Crawford expanded the confrontation right on originalist
grounds, the case law has never explicitly considered how the historical
understanding of confrontation espoused in the Raleigh trial and its
aftermath implicates dignitary interests. It now remains to consider how
this new understanding can help impose order on the thorny interpretive
issues left by Crawford and its progeny.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR POST-CRAWFORD JURISPRUDENCE
Dignity, as a constitutional value, is of value in its own right and
therefore distinct from the consequential benefits that may accompany
it.277 Therefore, while accuracy is a deeply important value protected by
the Confrontation Clause and a dignity-focused account of confrontation
may often harmonize with it, dignity must nonetheless be analyzed
separately. This dignitary interest consists primarily of the defendant’s
right to assert the moral weight of their embodied humanity in the face of
accusation, including the relational right to impose feelings of guilt on the
dishonest witness. If we accept these premises, several consequences
follow, which this Part will divide into the two most relevant problematic
categories emerging from the case law: statements to the police and
statements of lab technicians.
A.

Statements to Police

In Michigan v. Bryant, in an effort to compress Confrontation Clause
analysis back into hearsay analysis, the Supreme Court wholly ignored
the defendant’s dignitary interest in confronting a testimonial witness.278
Recall that in Bryant, the Court said, “[i]mplicit in Davis is the idea that
because the prospect of fabrication in statements given for the primary
purpose of resolving that emergency is significantly diminished, the
Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be subject to the
crucible of cross-examination.”279 The Court also observed that this “logic
is not unlike that justifying the excited utterances exception in hearsay
law.”280 Quite simply, in saying that the Sixth Amendment “does not
require” confrontation where “the prospect of fabrication” is
“diminished,” the Court read a dignitary interest out of the Confrontation

277.
278.
279.
280.

See Fletcher, supra note 215, at 173.
562 U.S. 344 (2011).
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 361.
Id.
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Clause altogether.281 Recall that one of the major pragmatic criticisms of
the Davis/Bryant “primary purpose” test has been that it is so fact-specific
that it creates results even less clear (and more prosecution-friendly) than
the garbled lab tech cases.282 This test’s uncertain outcomes compound its
dignitary problems for defendants.
This is not to say that all statements made to police should fall within
the ambit of Crawford. The distinction the Court made between Davis and
Hammon—between a victim’s plea for help to prevent violence in real
time and a victim giving a report after the fact—may have proved
workable were it not for the confusion added by Bryant. In the former
case, the Davis 911 call, it is fair to say, as the Court then did, that the
victim was not “testifying” but seeking aid.283 Yet a dignitary focus shows
why Scalia’s critiques of the changes wrought to Davis/Hammon by
Bryant were well-founded. Beyond largely displacing the “primary
purpose” analysis with, essentially, an accuracy analysis, Bryant
introduced the idea that the officer’s purpose in receiving a statement, in
addition to the declarant’s in making it, is relevant to determining whether
the statement was “testimonial.”284 As Scalia wrote in dissent:
In-court testimony is more than a narrative of past events; it is a
solemn declaration made in the course of a criminal trial. For an
out-of-court statement to qualify as testimonial, the declarant
must intend the statement to be a solemn declaration rather than
an unconsidered or offhand remark; and [they] must make the
statement with the understanding that it may be used to invoke the
coercive machinery of the State against the accused.285
He observed that “[a]n inquiry into an officer’s purposes would make
no sense when a declarant blurts out ‘Rick shot me’ as soon as the officer
arrives on the scene.”286 Understanding the defendant’s confrontation
interest as dignitary and relational vis-à-vis the witness adds further
coherence to Scalia’s insistence that only the speaker’s intent to testify
against the defendant is relevant, not the listener’s intent in receiving it.
This is because it is the dignitary harm of the speaker’s potential
deployment of state machinery against the defendant for their own ends
that can be partially redressed by the defendant’s confrontation with the
speaker.

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

See id. (emphasis added).
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); Bryant, 562 U.S. at 359.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 359–60.
Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 382.
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To give another example, one could imagine a declarant walking up to
an off-duty police officer—who has no intention of investigating any
offense, much less interrogating the specific declarant—and making an
accusation against a defendant. It should be irrelevant that the officer has
no subjective intent to collect evidence for a prosecution. If the State
subsequently introduces that statement at trial, it is making use of the
declarant’s considered, solemn statement. Furthermore—again,
regardless of the officer’s subjective intentions—the officer nonetheless
exists as an arm of the state; the state creates the conditions empowering
officers to act on what they have been told. In that statement, the declarant
uses the State to bring about a particular effect for the defendant. The
defendant’s dignity is, therefore, harmed by an inability to assert their
agency through an interpersonal confrontation with the declarant at trial.
Thus far, the rule emerging is that, in cases where the declarant’s
primary purpose is to give an accusatory narrative to a state actor, the
defendant’s dignitary interest in confrontation attaches. But other
considerations may also affect the analysis. To return, again, to the
archetype of the Raleigh trial, remember that Raleigh stated, “if my
accuser were dead or abroad, it were something. But he liveth, and is in
this very house!”287 This could, of course, be construed as a utilitarian
point, premised on the greater necessity of using out-of-court testimony
in cases where the speaker was dead or otherwise unavailable (a
consideration relevant to many of the traditional exceptions to the rule
against hearsay, and originally one of the two factors in the pre-Crawford
Confrontation Clause test stated in Ohio v. Roberts288). Even in Crawford,
the Court mentioned, in a passing footnote, that the “dying declaration”
exception to hearsay appeared, historically, also to be an exception to the
rule against ex parte statements embodied in the Confrontation Clause:
“Although many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is
authority for admitting even those that clearly are.”289
The accuracy-based reasoning that grounds the exception in hearsay
law turns on the familiar proposition that no one would want to meet their
maker with a “lie upon [their] lips.”290 But if, as the Crawford court insists,
the confrontation question turns on values other than accuracy, why
should the dying declaration be an exception? Even the Court appeared
unable to answer this. Considering this anomaly from a dignitary
perspective provides a potential answer: the defendant has far less of a
287. The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, supra note 143.
288. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
289. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
290. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (quoting R. v. Osman (1881) 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 1,
3 (Eng.)).
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relational interest in imposing the moral weight of their presence upon a
speaker who is already dead. A dead witness cannot assert their will in
any direction; their own human dignity has been extinguished. Even if the
State continues to use the witness’s words to disadvantage the defendant,
they are no longer a means to whatever their personal ends were, because
those ends have terminated. Thus, testimonial dying declarations do not
implicate the defendant’s dignitary interest in the same way as other
testimonial statements. Indeed, on this reasoning, the defendant’s
dignitary interests are weaker in all cases in which the speaker is dead by
the time of trial. The State’s argument here is weaker when the potentially
dishonest speaker lived for some time during which they presumably
reaped whatever were the private benefits of their out-of-court
testimony.291 Yet it is nonetheless clear that the defendant’s dignitary
interest in imposing moral guilt upon the potentially lying witness is
weaker where that witness no longer exists.
B.

Lab Technician Cases

The dignitary analysis also sheds light on some of the confusions
arising from the lab tech line of cases. Ronald Coleman and Paul Rothstein
helpfully break down the six possible theories remaining after the
Williams plurality under which courts can admit the out-of-court reports
of lab technicians.292 Here, I briefly touch on each and the relevance of
dignity analysis to its viability:
1. If the report were not testimonial (i.e., if it were a medical or
psychiatric report not prepared for the prosecution).293 This would not
seem to implicate the heightened dignitary interests that arise when a
declarant uses the state apparatus to affect the defendant. Thus, such
reports—already admissible under the status quo—would not be affected
by dignitary analysis.
2. If it were used as a foundation for expert testimony and not for the
truth of the matter contained in it. 294 This is the approach adopted by the
Williams plurality but rejected by five justices in Williams and by Justice
Gorsuch, apparently, in Stuart.295 Such a strategy offends the defendant’s
dignitary interests as clearly as it offends the accuracy interests Justice
Gorsuch identifies. The strategy allows a testifying “expert” to simply
291. Note, of course, that this reasoning does not apply in cases where the witness is simply
“abroad” or otherwise unavailable.
292. See Coleman & Rothstein, supra note 119, at 28.
293. Id. at 52.
294. Id. at 52–53.
295. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 67–68.
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“draw a conclusion” that may just be recitation of the results the out-ofcourt technician memorialized. On the one hand, it is a long-accepted
principle of the evidentiary laws governing experts that they are permitted
to testify based on hearsay evidence if it is the sort of information on
which an expert in the field might ordinarily rely in forming an opinion.
(So, for example, an accident recreation expert might rely on the out-ofcourt statements of witnesses, and so forth). As Gorsuch noted, however,
a case like Stuart poses accuracy problems beyond those normally
associated with expert testimony.296 It involves the expert not merely
considering a hearsay statement as one of a number of bases for forming
their own opinion, but instead simply parroting the entirety of the prior
lab tech’s results.
If such a method poses accuracy concerns, it poses distinct dignitary
concerns. The rules of evidence allowing experts to testify about opinions
formed on the basis of other parties’ out-of-court statements reflect the
goals of the common law of evidence, which created hearsay exceptions
based solely on accuracy. Such a model did not engage the Confrontation
Clause at all, much less the constitutional value of dignity. The potential
dignitary affront to a criminal defendant is at its peak where the state has
created its own evidence (whether in public labs or private labs funded by
public money) and introduced it in an adjudicatory system in which the
defendant is already at a dramatic power disadvantage. For additional
layers of state actors to block the defendant from face-to-face
confrontation with the accusing lab technician is an offense to their
dignitary interest in asserting their humanity during an already
objectifying process. Thus, this is a particularly weak justification for
admitting the out-of-court statements of lab techs.
3. Where the report is not specifically accusatory.297 This is the
Williams plurality’s other theory, based upon the fact that the Cellmark
test involved an anonymous subject rather than a particular, identified
suspect existing at the time the test was run. Like the second theory, this
represents the views of only four justices, though given the dissimilarity
of the BAC test at issue in Stuart, we cannot predict Justice Gorsuch’s
views on it. The Williams plurality made much of the fact that the DNA
profile had been produced by a private laboratory rather than the state
crime lab, as well as the fact that it was a full-scale DNA profile rather
than, as in Melendez-Diaz, a yes/no answer to the question of whether a
substance was contraband.298 It is clear that both considerations are highly
296. Stuart v. Alabama, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 36, 36 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
297. Id. at 53.
298. Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 84–86 (2012).
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relevant to the accuracy of the testimony. Presumably, a private lab has
less incentive to tamper with results than does a State-run crime lab. Even
more importantly, generating a DNA profile in the absence of a preidentified suspect is not the sort of enterprise a selfishly motivated
technician like Annie Dookhan could “throw” to benefit the state. In a
case like Williams, there is no “right” answer analogous to the reliably
positive results in Dookhan’s drug tests.
If we look at Williams from a dignitary perspective, however, it appears
somewhat different. Cellmark may have been a private lab, but it was paid
with state resources, resources the defendant most likely lacked. Thus,
like an eyewitness making an unsolicited report to a police officer, the
private actors at the lab were telling a fact-based story to a state listener.
The defendant’s lack of equal access to a firsthand account of that story
constitutes an affront to their dignitary interest in confronting their
accuser. It may be the case that courts should treat the significantly
increased accuracy benefits of this type of DNA evidence (as opposed to
the positive/negative drug sample tests) as rising to the level of
constitutional significance. But ignoring the dignitary rights defeated by
the Williams holding has not led to particularly clear case law. This is the
stronger of the plurality’s two justifications in Williams, but it nonetheless
creates dignitary problems that courts should address when refining this
doctrine.
4. Where the report lacks sufficient formality.299 These were the
grounds on which Justice Thomas concurred in Williams given the lack of
certification on the Cellmark report. This distinction is rather frivolous
when we compare an uncertified DNA report provided to a police
department with an unsolicited excited utterance made to a police officer.
If Jake runs up to a police officer and says, “Bob killed Nancy!” but never
gives a signed statement, it would seem curious not to apply Crawford
where we would if such a statement existed. (If anything, from an
accuracy standpoint, the lack of a signed statement would seem to render
the unsigned statement less rather than more reliable—certainly the
hearsay rules tend to treat formality as an indicium of reliability).
It is difficult to see why the reports of lab technicians should be any
different; when a technician generates a report based on a semen sample,
they know that it is eventually going to be part of a criminal prosecution.
And from a dignitary standpoint, the fact that the declarant knows that
their statement may become a weapon of the state is the statement’s most
important attribute, because it implicates the power relations between the
declarant, the state, and the defendant.

299. Id. at 54–55.
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5. Where the testifying witness is more than a mere “surrogate” or
“conduit” for the report because they had sufficient authority in the lab
that the report’s “entire analysis can be sufficiently tested by crossexamining the testifying expert.”300 This was the justification of the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces in Katso, allowing another lab technician
to testify about the rape kit run by an unavailable colleague. This theory
has a lot of pragmatic appeal on accuracy grounds, as it allows the
defendant to cross-examine the in-court witness about lab practices and
methods, including efforts made to prevent fraud, mishandling of samples,
and so forth. It does not, however, satisfy the defendant’s dignitary
interest in personal confrontation, which turns in part on the relational
right to make the relevant declarant present their narrative of accusation
face-to-face with the affected party.
6. Where a notice-and-demand statute exists and demand is not
made.301 The Court appeared to approve this practice in dicta in MelendezDiaz. It does not appear to raise dignitary concerns. Constitutional rights
may be waived by defendants most of the time, including by failure to
assert them, and there is nothing unique about this one that would make
waiver suspect.
To distill a rule from all of the above: apart from cases in which a
defendant has waived their Sixth Amendment right, or where a report is
made for reasons genuinely unrelated to prosecution, a defendant’s
dignitary interests in confrontation are heavily implicated in all cases in
which a state-funded lab report threatens to convict them. While courts
and practitioners have been understandably concerned with the time and
cost involved in making lab technicians physically available for trial, it is
important to note the context in which these cases arise. The entire pleabargaining system, which dispenses with trial rights for 90%–95% of
criminal defendants, is predicated primarily on efficiency concerns. As
this state of affairs is unlikely to change any time soon, despite the
dignitary costs it imposes on all criminal defendants, it is even more
important to vindicate the dignitary rights of those few defendants who
actually see trial.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown how the Supreme Court has overlooked the
dignitary aspects of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and has
noted the ways courts should weigh those rights in specific trial scenarios.
It does not suggest that the dignitary inquiry is the only relevant question
300. Id.
301. Id. at 55.
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courts should consider as they try to untangle the mess that is current
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Other values, including accuracy, are
relevant to creating a workable rule moving forward. The Court held in
Crawford that accuracy is not the lodestar of Confrontation Clause
analysis, yet in seventeen years, it has failed to provide a coherent
statement of what, exactly, is. This Article invites the Court to consider
the ways in which a dignitary framework sheds light on important values
inherent in confrontation. Harmonizing dignitary values with accuracy
and other values is a project that courts must necessarily address on a caseby-case basis. This Article merely proposes a concrete answer to a
question that has bedeviled commentators since the start of the Crawford
revolution: what is there in the confrontation right beyond accuracy? Why
do we care if a statement is explicitly testimonial, so long as it passes the
accuracy screen provided by the hearsay laws? This Article has sought to
show that there is a substantive residual to the confrontation right in cases
of “testimonial” out-of-court statements, one that is more than simply
formalistic. In better understanding the dignitary interests at stake in the
Confrontation Clause, courts can begin to untangle the morass left by
cases that have either relied on formal categories or considered accuracy
alone.
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